The Tacitus Project

Greatest NYT letter to the editor, ever

2005-06-16T21:50:00.000-07:00

I'm fairly agnostic about the war in Iraq, generally (unnecessary to begin, but necessary now to end correctly. But this is NYT letter to the editor has one of the best zingers I've ever seen, as it mocks both the NYT's (and mass media in general) fascination with movement politics (and particular with the young conservative movement--we've in recent months read about the Liberty Institute, wherever "Jeff Gannon went, the "academic bill of rights" and conservatives at Ivy League schools) as well as the soft underbelly of war-mongers of all political stripes- they wouldn't serve (see, Cheney, Dick; Bolton, John; Lieberman, Joseph, et al.). Seriously, now that I write it down, what is it with the Times and campus conservatives? Anyway, the zinger is highlighted. And regardless of whether you think it's a zinger, it's a great letter.

Published: June 17, 2005
To the Editor:

Re "Next Generation of Conservatives (by the Dormful)" (front page, June 14):

The young conservatives mentioned in your article could find another form of employment that is more useful and more honorable than rooting out excesses in the Park Service.

Given the Army's difficulties of retaining combat veteran junior officers (of whom I was one), these young, physically fit and intelligent men and women could both learn valuable leadership lessons and help stem the damage to the Army caused by President Bush's war in Iraq.

I know from experience that a summer in Falluja or Ramadi will better prepare them for careers as drug industry lobbyists than any conservative hothouse.

I trust that it's not too much to ask that our young conservative elites actually serve in the war they support so much.

Rich Smith

Anne Applebaum on Newsweek

2005-05-18T16:25:00.000-07:00

Anne Applebaum (author of the fantastic account of the Soviet labor camps Gulag) has an excellent column in today's Washington Post regarding the flap over Newsweek's now retracted Koran/toilet flushing story. Short version: Newsweek f-ed up, to be sure. But the more worrisome thing, for most of us, should be that the story was so plausible to the Islamic world to begin with.

Registan

2005-05-16T17:46:00.000-07:00

Solid coverage of the unfolding drama in Uzbekistan on www.registan.net.
Check them out.

And now for something a little different...

2005-05-16T16:01:00.000-07:00

...I bring you this lame op-ed from the NY Times on why American billionaire Malcolm Glazer shouldn't be allowed to buy British football ("soccer") team Manchester United.

Let's look closely at some of the arguments and claims:

[Warning: extensive quoting to follow.]

1. "A scarcely less important English contribution to humanity is team sports - above all, soccer."

As the French would say, "pardon?" First of all, England gave the world team sports? England gave the world soccer? Neither claim is empirically or historically accurate. As for the apparent claim to team sports in general, well that's too silly to even address. While the modern form of soccer probably has its roots in England, the game traces roots much, much further back. This just looks like nationalist grandstanding.

2. The author goes on to outline that Glazer, as an American, doesn't or can't understand the "honored spot" that Man U occupies in the British football fan's imagination (tell that to an Arsenal supporter!). Man U's story is "unusually weighted with sentiment," the author writes, before going over some of the more poignant points in Man U history.

That's cool and all, as cultural/sentimental arguments go. It's also beside the point. British soccer is a business now (has been for a long time). In fact, as the author acknowledges later, it's a global business. Glazer is a businessman, and his purchase of the team was business all the way. So this isn't really about sentiment is it?

3. The author claims that objections to Glazer are not about his American-ness, per se, but because he doesn't appear to be a football fan. Evidence: a) Many foreign players and coaches in British football. b) Roman Abramovich, Russian billionaire and Chelsea owner.

Exhibit A: Though many foreign players and coaches are employed in the megabusiness that is the Premier League, there are still regular and ugly incidents of racism and xenophobia, sometimes on the pitch, often in the stands. That's not a problem unique to British soccer (it's worse in Italy, for example), but to claim that UK football is totally beyond nativism is to simply ignore reality.

Exhibit B: as a big Russia watcher and armchair analyst, I had to stifle a laugh at the characterization of Roman Abramovich as simply a guy "who arrived with an immense fortune acquired in the oil business, ready to buy the club and to buy success." Now, this op-ed was probably no place to mention the shady roots of Abramovich's wealth or his current ties to the Kremlin. But the author invites a comparison of Abramovich and Glazer, characterizing the former as "OK" as a foreign owner because he attends matches and cheers on his team (i.e., is a football fan, it seems) while Glazer "hasn't set foot in Old Trafford."

So let's look at the comparison in a fuller light. We have a Russian billionaire who became rich through political machinations, corruption, and gangster capitalism in Russia (aka, "the oil business" apparently). And we have an American billionaire who started with his father's jewelry repair business and got rich in investments ranging from mobile homes to energy (including a number of notable failed bids -- including an attempted takeover of Harley-Davidson). One has a record of consistently working within the law. I'll let you guess which one (here's a hint: it's not the one who is an acceptable British football team owner).

4. Finally, we get down to business. And here's where the argument against Glazer starts to get really loopy.

First, the author notes that Man U is "hugely successful and profitable club". Exactly. So it should come as no surprise that a businessman like Glazer would try to take it over, should it?

Second, the author makes a fairly incomprehensible critique of the fact that Glazer is conducting a leveraged buy-out: "up to $500 million of the money Glazer is using for the purchase is borrowed against the assets of the debt-free club itself, giving fresh meaning to leverage." Man U is still debt-free. That Glazer is borrowing money (against shares in Man U that he already owns) to gain control of the club doesn't mean the club itself is going into debt.

Third, the author seems to fault Tony Blair for not blocking this transaction: "Prime Minister Tony Blair has kept out of the way: who owns a soccer club is for the market to decide, the government says." Of course that's what the government says. Because that's reality. The state isn't in the business of soccer, and regulating soccer ownership IS NOT for the government to decide. I suspect most British agree.

Fourth, the author faults Glazer himself, stating that the American "has not reckoned with the emotions this particular transaction has aroused, and threatened boycotts by fans could still have a sobering effect."

On the issue of emotions, we don't know whether Glazer reckoned with them or not. As a businessman, I suspect that even if he had considered the emotional aspect, he would have made the calculation that getting control of a "hugely successful and highly profitable club" was worth the price of some bruised English egos.

On the issue of boycotts, let's be serious. If Man U really does occupy such a special place in the English public imagination, do true fans really care who owns it? A lot of folks in New York hate George Steinbrenner, but they still cheer for the Yankees. What kind of true football fan would stop supporting their team just because they didn't like the new owner? Moreover, as the author himself notes, much of Man U's profitability derives from its popularity in Asia (e.g.: "games from Old Trafford are watched live in China by more people than inhabit the British Isles"). You think those folks in China care who owns Man U? You think they share whatever sentimental attachment aging Brits might ascribe to the club? I think not.

Summary: This piece was crap. In fact, it reminded me of nothing more than American fears about Japanese takeovers of things American (like the Seattle Mariners baseball team). It wasn't the end of baseball, or the Mariners (in fact, they've done quite well under Japanese ownership). Moreover, baseball has enjoyed growing popularity in Japan (though it had already been popular there for some time), especially since Japanese players have begun playing in the Major Leagues. If Glazer's purchase of Man U raises the profile of soccer in the US, it is the Premier League and soccer around the world that will benefit.

Uzbekistan Update

2005-05-16T12:50:00.000-07:00

Here's what the BBC has to say. More here.

A few thoughts, not fully formed but here they are nonetheless:

The Ferghana Valley (in which Andijan lies) is one of the most conservative Islamic areas in former Soviet Central Asia. As such, there have been long-standing concerns, both among governments in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, as well as among outside experts, that the valley could be a lynchpin for Islamist-led instability in the region. It's important to acknowledge that when the Uzbek government cites concerns about Islamic extremism, these fears are not wholly unfounded or invented.

That said, the events that led up to the violence in Andijan bear none of the hallmarks of radical Islamist activity. There doesn't appear to have been significant planning involved -- rather it looks rather spontaneous. In the past, Islamists have staged jailbreaks and attacked military and police checkpoints. But these have all be carefully planned. What happened in Andijan sounds, by media descriptions, more like a riot: unarmed protestors gather outside government buildings, then eventually "storm" the buildings (staging a sit-in, of sorts), then the government violently intervenes. This wasn't an Islamist attack such as those we've seen in Russia (the school and theatre hostage takings, the storming of the police post in Daghestan), where there were armed militants, a clear plan of attack (if not a clear, obtainable objective) and a clear (eventually declaration of responsbility by an Islamist group (in the foregoing Russia cases, the Chechen independence movement).

It's important to note the character of the incident in Andijan because it exposes the lie in the Uzbek government line -- that Andijan was just another honest effort by the government to quell Islamist-fomented instability. The Andijan incident was not fomented by Islamist provacateurs, but by the Karimov regime's own repressive political policies and its failed economic policies. As key partners (if not "supporters") of the Karimov regime, the United States needs to more forcefully call "bullshit" when that regime tries to make us look like fools with such transparent excuses for repression. After all, ultimately Karimov has much more to lose than us -- both in losing US aid and in possibly losing his post (and his head) should he be brought down.

American equivocations -- condemning in words (but not really actions) Uzbek government violence while also condemning the protestors -- advances US interests not a centimeter. We lose the "hearts and minds" of the Uzbek people, we lose whatever moral high ground we might want to claim and most importantly, we lose the chance to make the important point to tin-man dictator allies elsewhere (are you listening, Pervez Musharraf?) that while we may deal with you -- even generously -- we will not kowtow, and we will call you out where dictator values come into such sharp conflict with our own fundamental values.

Updates:
1. Eurasianet has a good post on the Andijan uprising here. The author makes -- and better substantiates -- many of the points I raised above.
2. Disturbing quotation from the Afghan foreign minister here, essentially blaming al Qaeda for Andijan. This makes no sense, as there is no evidence and there has been no suggestion elsewhere that al Qaeda was in any way involved. But most alarming is that the statement demonstrates the extent to which diplomats around the world have internalized the notion that if you justify a policy by claiming it is part of the war on terrorism, the US will give you a free pass (i.e. without even looking into the truthfulness of that justification)...

Domino Theory

2005-05-14T02:08:00.000-07:00

Is Uzbekistan next? It certainly is starting to look like it. Which would be a mixed blessing for the US, which has cozied up perhaps too close for comfort now to the Karimov regime.

John Tierney...

2005-05-03T01:16:00.000-07:00

...Worst. NY Times. Columnist. Ever.
I mean, this guy is such a hack.

"But middle-class Americans don't simply cast ballots for Republicans. They also vote with their feet, which is why blue states and old Democratic cities are losing population to red states and Republican exurbs. People are moving there precisely because of economic reasons - more jobs, affordable houses, and the lower taxes offered by Republican politicians."

Tierney doesn't even attempt to support his claims with evidence, or any effort at reporting whatsoever. It's just a string of naked assertions. As a blogger, I can do this. I expect more from a NY Times columnist. They've really sunk to a new low, in the name of balance. Give me a real right-wing ideologue, a Bill Kristol or something -- someone with a real, authentic and authoritative voice. Not some party-banner waving hack a la John Tierney or Hugh Hewitt!

Be Careful What You Wish For...

2005-04-21T00:08:00.000-07:00

...David Brooks is probably right -- that the country needs an honest discussion about a woman's right to choose and abortion. But he may not be happy with the outcome. Every poll I've ever seen shows the country is solidly pro-choice and moving pro-choicer. Demographics will only favor the Republicans for so long on this issue.

Bad Weekend at the NY Times

2005-04-10T22:04:00.000-07:00

I was going to jump all over the NY Times for this ridiculous article about the supposed sweeping social phenomenon that the Times has helpfully coined the "Man Date", but I'm happy to report that Jeremy Blachman and others have done that job for me.

Instead, I'll call attention to another problematic story I saw this morning, entitled "Two Women, Bound by Sports, War and Injuries". A more appropriate title would have been, Two Women, Bound by a Lazy Media. The article portrayed two soldiers, both former college basketball players, who both lost arms while serving in Iraq. Each story, individually, is powerful and deserves telling. But these two women, one gathers quickly from the content of the story, don't feel bound to each other. They don't really seem to even like each other. The only reason they are connected is because the press has made their stories connected. It's cool when someone in the media lifts the curtain a little and acknowledges just how much they drive the news stories we hear. More alarming is when you can feel the media driving the story (i.e. artificially linking two wholly separate stories in the public consciousness), but the reporter seems unaware that she is doing it...

Kyrgyzstan, Continued

2005-04-04T14:43:00.000-07:00

I don't agree with all of the analysis of this piece from RFE/RL, but it does represent the fullest account that I've seen regarding the events that precipitated the dramatic fall of the Akaev regime on March 24. Worth a read.

Kyrgyzstan, Finally

2005-03-28T20:47:00.000-08:00

Not as in "they finally ousted Akaev", but as in "Tacitus finally opines on the Kyrgyzstan situation". If you haven't heard about the "Tulip Revolution" by now, well, frankly I am confused how you might have stumbled across my little, tiny, wee corner of cyberspace.

A few off-the-cuff observations about the Kyrgyz "coup".
1) "Tulip Revolution" is a really stupid name. Why do we feel the need to name each and every transition in the former Eastern bloc? I mean, the "Rose Revolution" and "Orange Revolution" in Georgia and Ukraine, respectively, were extremely different in the sense that they involved incumbents losing in actual, scheduled elections (not like the American Revolution, or the French Revolution), while in Kyrgyzstan what occurred was more like an abdication (again, not like a full on revolution in the traditionally understood sense). But I object less to the use of the the word revolution than the naming policy in general. It's silly, making my fervent objections to it silly as well. I'll stop.

2) This won't happen anywhere else in Central Asia, at least not in the same manner and not anytime soon. In Turkmenistan, I think there is a real risk of an actual violent coup to take out Niyazov. A popular uprising of the sort in Kyrgyzstan is unlikely. Uzbekistan is more cohesive geographically and ethnically than Kyrgyzstan (no yawning North-South divide) and Karimov is a much more savvy dictator than Akaev could ever hope to be. In Kazakhstan, Nazarbaev is both savvy, like Karimov, and genuinely fairly popular, unlike other Central Asian leaders. In Tajikistan, well, people seem fairly content with Rakhmonov and who the heck cares about Tajikistan anyways? In Afghanistan, Karzai is more likely to be offed or forced out by force than by a demonstration (not that I'm saying either are truly likely).

3) The Kyrgyz "opposition" (scare quotes employed because to speak of an single, unitary opposition in Kyrgyzstan simply impossible) is NOT READY to lead the country. They don't have the organizational capacities, they don't have the cooperation and most importantly, in contrast to Georgia or Ukraine (or, going back further, Poland or the Czech republic), they don't have a recognizable and charismatic leader. Perhaps Bakiev will emerge as such, though I have little hope for a person whose chief accomplishment as prime minister (under Akaev, incidentally) was being fired after police killed several demonstrators at an opposition rally AGAINST his government (which was a major turning point against Akaev himself). Another likely candidate, former Bishkek mayor and Interior Minister Felix Kulov, who until last week was imprisoned on probably trumped up charges, looks much stronger. But Kulov has been in prison, and hence cut off from the bulk of the opposition, so he would need somebody closer to the fray to step up for him to consolidate backing. And Kulov is widely believed to have ties to either Russia's FSB or the CIA, Either rumor definitely works against him.

4) The BIG, HUGE elephant in the room that no one in the Western press seems to want to talk about: Akaev fled when it became clear that his police and military would no longer defend him against the demostrators. Someone made that decision -- I've heard reports that the guards around the presidential palace left the area in an orderly fashion, and police were abruptly called off after several fairly violent melees with the crowd. Who was that person/group? Whoever controls the security forces has substantial leverage over the survival of the interim as well as an permanent governments, should he/she/they choose to exert that leverage. That's a major potential power broker unaccounted for.

5) There is still many dicey days ahead for Kyrgyzstan. There exists the North-South conflict, which looms ominously and is largely unaddressed. The strongest opposition to Akaev was always concentrated in the South, but the seat of political power is in Bishkek and the North. The Southern opposition feel that they were responsible for Akaev's ouster, while it was the folks in Bishkek who were the one's sitting at Akaev's desk last week. These two groups need to find a way to peacefully divide up the political spoils of their work, or it could get ugly fast. Also in this cocktail we need to throw in the fact that the South is much more traditional and Muslim, and there is therefore an opening for radical Islamist activity, particularly in the always unstable Ferghana Valley.

So while we in the US of A are all "rah rah democracy sweeps the CIS", let's not forget the real risks that still exist, and unfortunately these risks are largely outside of our control. We simply need to take whatever steps we can, both diplomatically and covertly, to ensure that Kyrgyzstan stays as stable as possible in the coming months.

Update: I thought I was adding some realism to the public discourse. Elinor Burkett has an even more dire take on the recent events and hope for the future in the NY Times.

Tajik-Afghan Border Handover

2005-03-16T11:33:00.000-08:00

Frequently I've ruminated on Russia's pernicious influence on its near neighbors/former satellites (e.g. Georgia, Ukraine, etc.). However, there are times when Russia deserves its due. Russia's work -specifically, the service of the 201st motorized division -- trying to secure the difficult Tajik-Afghan border has been a great service to the international community. It has cut down on drug trafficking, the exportation of radical Islamist instability to northern Central Asia, and probably saved Tajikistan from falling into the same anarchy as its southern neighbor. In light of Russia's contributions -- and the strategic importance of the Tajik-Afghan border as a buffer against Afghanistan's problems finding their way northward and eastward, reports such as this Radio Liberty report (in Tajik, so brush up on your language skills) make me rather nervous. (Brief summary: Tajikistan has instructed Russia that its border guard services are no longer required. The two countries are now in talks to hand over control of the border by 2006, with the first phase of the handover to start in April.)

As noted, I usually want Russia to reduce its involvement in the former Soviet states. But in the vital area of security, where Russia's involvement is clearly in the interests of both Tajikistan and the world community, I am more ambivalent. Tajikistan may think it can handle the border duties, but Tajikistan has been a functioning state for less than 10 years. Of course, much depends on the stability of Afghanistan in the near future -- if it is stable, then there is less to worry about, and the Tajiks should as a sovereign state control their own border security. But that is a big if, and Tajikistan's sovereignty itself depends in part on a secure border to deter Islamist incursions.

Win the Battle, Lose the War

2005-03-08T22:10:00.000-08:00

Former Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov was killed today in Tolstoi Yurt, Chechnya in a Russian-led raid on his bunker, which was hidden under a house, according to this BBC story. The accompanying BBC obituary of Maskhadov paints a very charitable picture of the man (claiming he did more to "win" the first Chechen war (1994-96) than any other rebel leader). I would be more inclined to say Dudayev, the first Chechen president, was more important than Maskhadov, but Maskhadov certainly played a role. Unfortunately, and neither BBC article adequately emphasizes this, Maskhadov's influence has been on the wane virtually since the day he won the Chechen presidency in 1997. This is unfortunate both for Maskhadov, who seemed like a relatively honorable man and soldier, and for the Chechen people, who could have benefited from his moderating influence. But alas Chechnya is now left to the fractious butchers, Basaev and the Wahhabis on one side, and the brutal Russian stooge Kadyrov and his crew on the other side... Moscow may find cause for celebration in Maskhadov's death, as they had labeled him -- next to Basaev -- as enemy #1 in Chechnya. But I fear Maskhadov's demise brings Chechnya no closer to peace; indeed, the loss of the ineffectual but still unifying figure probably takes the republic a step closer to anarchy.

Addendum: Odd circumstances of death for Maskhadov, at least as described by Kadyrov, who said the field commander was killed by one of his own bodyguards who was careless with his gun.

Of course, Kadyrov also said Maskhadov's death "was a present to all Chechen women on International Women's Day." Classy.

Meanwhile, In Azerbaijan

2005-03-05T00:17:00.000-08:00

Deja vu: the Gongadze case, take two. Taking out troublesome journalists worked really well for Kuchma. We'll see if Aliev can pull off the same trick.

Gongadze Communicates from Beyond the Grave

2005-03-05T00:09:00.000-08:00

Back in Ukraine, the ghost of Georgiy Gongadze, the investigative journalist murdered (decapitated) under suspicious circumstances, continued to take revenge on the former party of power, as former interior minister Yuri Kravchenko opted to commit suicide rather than testify in the murder investigation. Ukraine's prosecutor general this week said the case was near closure, a major victory for new Ukrainian President Viktor Yuschenko and the erstwhile Ukrainian opposition, who used the unsolved Gongadze murder as a rallying cry for the past four years.

This is bad news for ex Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, who has long denied involvement in the killing, though he has been caught on tape all but demanding Gongadze's life. This BBC story covers the basics pretty well. Check it out.

Syria Op-Ed

2005-03-01T22:12:00.000-08:00

Excellent op-ed in the New York Times today by ex-NSCer Flynt Leverett. Leverett cautions against the "maximalist" strategy preferred by the Bush administration and recommends a more realistic policy, which acknowledges that US interests are probably not best served at present by a Hezbollah-dominated Lebanon or a chaotic, post-Assad Syria. Money paragraph:

To exploit the current moment wisely, the Bush administration must abandon ideological attachments to a bygone era when Maronite Christian leaders dominated Lebanon or fantasies of a strategically neutered democratic state emerging in Syria over the next few months. We have been down this road before, during Lebanon's civil war; it ends with Americans killed or taken hostage in terrorist attacks, and our credibility damaged by our inability to undergird rhetoric with sustainable policy.

While Turkmenistan, Believe It Or Not, Slides Even Lower

2005-03-01T13:25:00.000-08:00

I really wasn't sure there was much more Turkmen dictator Saparmurat Niyazov could do to hurt the Turkmen people (after closing schools and universities, libraries, cultural venues, oppressing Russians and non-Muslim minorities, imposing a state-sponsored version of Islam, the list goes on). But he has outdone even himself, with his order of the closure of hospitals outside the capital of Ashghabat. Not content to deprive his citizens of liberty, property and other basic rights, he now is striking indirectly at the most basic right of all -- life -- by condemning his largely village-dwelling people to life without proper medical care. Turkmenistan is the size of California, folks. It's not like people can just pop in to Asghabat for a doctor's visit, never mind for urgent care. Niyazov has been a disgrace for too long, and the international community has sat complacent for too long. What must he do before we are moved to action?*

*Purely a rhetorical question; of course, I am aware that absent a full-on genocide, an invasion of a neighboring country, or a serious attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction, the international community will not be moved to seriously pressure such a tinpot dictator in the backwoods of the world.

Georgia Continues To Teeter

2005-03-01T13:01:00.000-08:00

Along the lines of yesterday's posts, we see in this RFE/RL report that the nascent democracies that the US backs rhetorically to the hilt are still on incredibly shaky ground and could use some more substantive US political support. In this case, it's Georgia, where the reformist government that swept in 2003's "Rose Revolution" (that was the one after the Velvet Revolution (Czechoslovakia), but before the Orange Revolution (Ukraine -- 2004), Purple Revolution (what Bush has apparently taken to calling Iraq (2005) and Cedar Revolution (what breathless neo-cons are calling the fall of the Lebanese government) has already been accused of backsliding into authoritarianism. Now, I don't think that they are -- I think they are legitimately trying to consolidate power in a country too long fractured by internal divisions. However, the attempted assassination on the Abkhaz prime minister is an indication of just how dangerous and unstable Georgia still is, politically.

In this latest incident, we see again the pernicious and destabilizing influence Russia continues to play in its periphery. If the US is serious about creating conditions for democracy to thrive in that part of the world, like in the mid-East, we need to create the necessary secure incubator. This means telling Russia to butt out. Washington doesn't want to do that, for obvious reasons relating to the perceived importance of US-Russia ties and not upsetting that supposedly fragile alliance (Washington has a congenital inability to stand up to allies that are more stubborn than we are -- not the weak Europeans, but the hard cases like Saudi Arabia, Russia, China et al). But if we fail to come to the assistance of these new democracies in the former Soviet Union, with as much energy as we've approached the Middle East of late, then we risk seeing these democracies fail, and then the creation of another backwater like the Middle East to endure the next thirty years.

Changing the Tone

2005-02-28T23:22:00.000-08:00

It's a measure of how successful the Bush administration has been in shifting the way many Americans look at the Middle East to look at today's otherwise dire headlines ("Bomb Attack in Iraq Kills 115" and "Lebanon's Cabinet Resigns En Masse After Street Protests")and still see a NY Times Op-Ed entitled "Mid-East Climate Change" extolling many recent developments in the region as for the better.

Not to be a stick in the mud, but while I'd like to share the paper of record's optimism, I am not sure I do, at least not across the board (Lebanon looks like it might be getting better; I have my already expressed reservations about Egypt. Let's not even get into Saudi Arabia or Iran). In darker times, pre-Bush administration engagement, we would be talking about countries teetering on the brink of anarchy, not "opportunities for democracy to flourish" (in the cases of Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon. That the Bush administration is engaged is a good thing, and hopefully will help be a guarantor of the positive outcomes the Times seems to think are around the bend. Still, how many of these developments can be attributed to Bush administration policies? Hard to say, though pro-democracy movements certainly seem emboldened these days.

I guess I am just not sure that the shift in American policy under the Bush administration has been fundamental enough to undo the 30 years of pretty bad policy we've had in the region. We still support the Saudi royal family. We still support Mubarak. We still support Musharraf in Pakistan. We support tinpot dictators throughout Central Asia. We have give more and better lip service to democracy than in the past, but we cannot put democracy in action for others. We have tried to provide a security incubator for democratic governments to grow in Afghanistan and Iraq, but it's far from clear those two governments will live out next few years, given the on-going insurgencies in those countries.

When we begin to see American pressure for change by important allies such as Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, then we'll know that there has really been a "climate change" in the Middle East -- both in terms of US policy and on the ground in the countries that matter in the region.

Mubarak Parries

2005-02-26T13:01:00.000-08:00

With this surprise announcement to amend the Egyptian Constitution in such a way that would seem to allow for multi-party elections.

I would caution extreme skepticism about this whole "democracy comes to Egypt" gambit by Mubarak, for a number of reasons, some of which I'll list below:

1) The Egyptian government, top to bottom, is full of Mubarak cronies, appointees and flunkies. In the medium-term (say, 30 years) any opposition candidate will face a gauntlet of institutional challenges at every step from these henchmen to the regime.

2) Candidates will have to be members of registered parties; so one threshold test for any multi-party election is for a party to actually get registered. This will be a particularly daunting task for the Islamist parties, many of which have ties to terrorist/militant organizations. Their candidates will never get the chance to appear on the ballots, as their parties will be barred from registering.

3) Mubarak and his side have tremendous resources -- organizational (the apparatus of the state), institutional, financial -- and the time to effectively monopolize power even in a system where many candidates are allowed to run.

Now, that's not to say the announcement of contested democratic elections in Egypt is a bad thing. Even merely going through the motions of democracy might have some benefit, as election mechanisms and institutions can develop, and a culture of voting can perhaps take hold among the electorate. But let's not make too much of Mubarak's announcement either. He's still in a bad place, and this latest move is still just another act by a desperate leader.

Not In A Good Place: Hosni Mubarak

2005-02-24T12:04:00.000-08:00

We hear a lot about the US and Europe's tensions with Middle Eastern leaders. Behind the faux-united front that the Arab League likes to put on, however, lies a fascinating and complicated set of relationships between Middle Eastern and North African states, as various states and branches of Islam vie for primacy in the Islamic world and beyond...

So it was interesting to see the amount of pressure that Egyptian "President" Hosni Mubarak is coming under these days. In the Washington Post today, we learn that he faces pressure from within Egypt, as well as from the United States, to liberalize his hold on power.

But more interesting, to me at least, was this brief tidbit reported by RFE/RL: Egypt arrested an accused Iranian agent who (under torture, no doubt) confessed to trying to organize Mubarak's assassination. Serious stuff. I mean, the US will hardly even threaten Egypt (it's second biggest foreign aid recipient (just behind Israel, which gets much of its aid in the form of military assistance) with a cut in foreign aid funds. But Tehran, well, they don't go for such half measures anyway; easier to just off the guy. Or at least, so the Egyptian government like you to believe.

Whatever lies behind the Iran-Mubarak assassination story, it's easy to see Mubarak is in a bad place right now. He's under pressure from within, from his biggest patron (that's us folks, for better or worse), and from regional rivals. Let's see how this survivor weathers this storm...

Chechens Arrested in Klebnikov Probe

2005-02-22T23:03:00.000-08:00

Just found this wire story about the arrest of two Chechens in Minsk in the investigation into the slaying of Forbes Russia editor Paul Klebnikov.

The Chechen connection has been floated for quite some time, as it seems the natural Russian impulse in recent years is to blame the Chechens for whatever the latest tragedy has been. It may in fact be correct, in this case, as Klebnikov wrote some not so nice things about Chechens, and one powerful Chechen in particular, in his book "Conversations with a Barbarian", which was based on chats with ex-Chechen rebel Khozh-Akhmed Nukhayev.

Hopefully, the arrests are a breakthrough in the case. Until we get more evidence than the word of the Belarussian and Russian governments, however, I remain skeptical.

Yuschenko Poisoning Update

2005-02-22T17:27:00.000-08:00

Reviving a dormant, but important, story, the BBC files this update on the investigation into the apparent dioxin poisoning of Ukrainian PM (then-candidate) Viktor Yuschenko.

Currently the focus of the investigation is on Russian political advisor Gleb Pavlovsky, who was advising Yuschenko's opponent (and Russia's preferred candidate) Vladimir Yanukhovich.

The BBC report, unfortunately, perpetuates a somewhat discredited link between a dinner Yuschenko attended at the home of the deputy head of the Ukrainian KGB on the night of September 5, a night or two before the candidate fell ill. I've heard that story is problematic for two reasons:
1) The symptoms of dioxin poisoning typically take longer than 24 hours to manifest themselves.
2) There have been some reports that a) the KGB officer in question was a friend and supporter of Yuschenko, and the meeting may have been an effort to coordinate between the opposition and KGB should a serious election problem arise.

As one observer in the BBC report itself is quoted, that the Ukrainian KGB poisoned Yuschenko at a dinner they hosted is "too obvious, too unprofessional", even for the Ukrainian KGB.

On to the Russian connection: assuming Yuschenko was poisoned (and if you've seen the photographs, it doesn't seem like a huge leap), whatever Yuschenko was poisoned with could only have been manufactured in certain places: topping that list would have to be Russia, the US, and possibly some rogue state (North Korea probably likes chemicals, but they may be too busy with Nukes at present). I think it's safe to assume the US didn't release any its poisons to kill its preferred PM candidate, and if it was a chemical cocktail of US manufacture it is likely that the materials were swiped by a very capable foreign secret service (such as Russia). More likely than not, therefore, the poison came from Russia.

But just because the poison was of Russian manufacture doesn't mean that the Russian government necessarily played a hand in the apparent attempt on Yuschenko's life. Russian scientists work in underfunded conditions, and many lab directors would no doubt welcome the opportunity to 1) sell off some surplus 2) contract out some work off the Russian gov't account.

Pavlovsky seems to me a poor candidate to pin the blame on precisely because he is close to the Kremlin. No one at the Kremlin gains from hanging him out to dry, since it brings the focus on a suspect so close to them (if he is so close to the Kremlin, how come they didn't know what was up, unless they were tacitly supporting the hit?). I believe Russia is capable of a lot of strongarm tactics (and brutality, at times), but I don't know that they feared Yuschenko so much that it was better to kill him then to see what would happen upon his election. Moscow has plenty of leverage over Ukraine (gas supplies, economic dependency, cultural affinity, etc.) regardless of who is in power, so Yuschenko would have been forced to play nicely with them.

Beirut Update

2005-02-15T11:40:00.000-08:00

Lee Smith of Slate has this excellent article on some of the enjeux at play in Lebanon right now, and how the presence of US troops in Iraq has complicated Middle Eastern politics immeasurably, in ways both good and bad (for both the US and the countries).

Tough talk only works if you back it up with action; for better or worse, to this point the Bush administration has largely backed up its tough talk (with regards to Iraq and Afghanistan, but also it appears with Iran). On other fronts, however, the Bush administration has been more bark than bite (North Korea and Libya, for example). That's not to call into question the wisdom of the "foward-looking" US policies towards any of these countries (too long a discussion to have now), but the point is, if we're going to take that tact with Syria, we damn well be prepared to back it up, somehow.*

*Things I am not advocating: invasion of Iran, Syria or anywhere else. Things I am advocating: the toughest possible measures to combat the pernicious influence of Syria on its neighbors.

Update II: Michael Young, editor of the Beirut Daily Star (also writing on Slate), adds his thoughts on the possible repercussions of the Hariri assassination here.

Beirut Bombing

2005-02-14T22:54:00.000-08:00

Somewhat of a surprise that the most significant terrorist act in the Middle East of recent memory happened not in Iraq or Israel or the occupied territories, but in Beirut. The horrific car-bomb assassination of ex-Lebanese PM Rafik Hariri is like a flashback to the 1980s. All sorts of shadowy characters, shifting alliances and an international component as well, what with the bombing exposing the increasing rift between the U.S. and Syria. Washington has all but blamed Syria for the assassination.

In the Middle East, the usually reliable pro-Israeli Debka File sees the hand of Syria in the assassination as well, while al-Jazeera said the person who claimed responsibility spoke Arabic like a foreigner, whatever that means.

Where the situation goes from here is very touch-and-go. The U.S. is engaged, because the assassination is a useful backdrop for their beefs with the Syrian regime -- chief among these being Syria's state sponsorship of terrorism (case in point) as well as its relations with the worst elements of its neighbors (the Baathists in Iraq and the hoods in Lebanon. France is engaged, due to its historical connections to Lebanon and its use of that country in the past ten years as a stepping stone towards a higher-profile role in Mid-East affairs. Syria is of course engaged, both due to its involvement in Lebanon as well as its heightened confrontation with the U.S. And with Syrian involvement comes Iranian involvement. So Lebanon -- the tinderbox of the Middle East in the 1980s -- once again threatens to be the spark that sets the fertile Crescent ablaze. It will take some tactful diplomacy on all sides to save the situation.

When It Rains, It Pours

2005-02-09T01:33:00.000-08:00

The UN, in the midst of another PR shitstorm. First, the oil-for-food thing breaks, now fraud at the UN-operated World Meteorological Agency. Who would have predicted such rough sailing? Certainly not their weather bureau, which was too busy skimming $3 million off the budget.

On Gay Parents

2005-02-04T23:18:00.000-08:00

From the 11-year old daughter

of gay parents:

"I know some people don't like gays and lesbians because they think they are bad people. That's just a stereotype and it's kind of hurtful. I don't think people should think of us as very different. We are just the same except we have two moms."

Bless her.

Update on Zhvania

2005-02-03T01:18:00.000-08:00

This NY Times piece fills in more blanks on Zhvania and provides more reason to believe he wasn't a likely assassination target (political moderate, conciliatory attitude towards Shevardnadze). However, Zhvania was also the point man for government negotiations with Georgia's recalcitrant (Russia-backed) provinces -- a position where he could easily and quickly have amassed some enemies, despite his moderate positions. Also, it appears I too hastily blamed the Soviet-era central gas heating system -- which predictably wasn't operating. Instead it looks like an Iranian made heater was to blame...

Georgian PM Found Dead

2005-02-03T01:08:00.000-08:00

This story could easily be missed in the press, but it strikes me as fairly important. The gist: Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania was found dead in a friend's apartment (along with the friend). Official cause of death: a gas leak. My gut tells me the official story is probably accurate. Gas leaks are fairly common in the old Soviet-style apartment complexes. But then again, politically motivated killings are, too. After many years living and working in the former Soviet Union, I am sure the rumor mill in Tbilisi is churning tonight. Zhvania used to be a close associate of ousted Georgian President Eduard Sheverdnadze, before jumping to the "opposition" (now the ruling party) before the "Rose Revolution" in fall 2003. There could be some disgruntled ex (or current) special services agent willing to pull off what would be a fairly straightforward hit, if one knew Zhvania's plans for the evening in advance. Again, this is pure speculation, but interesting to ponder nonetheless. I'd be interested to know if anyone finds other details regarding Zhvania's life (connections, etc.) and death.

Let It Be...

2005-01-20T18:59:00.000-08:00

This is now a bit dated, but this NY Times Week in Review piece could serve as a classic example of the press' impulse to invoke 9/11 whenever possible, even when manifestly inappropriate. The author links the new Apple iPod Shuffle, which randomly downloads music from your library (rather than pre-selected playlists, as on the iPod and iPod Mini) to Malcolm Gladwell's book "Blink", which argues that many decisions made spur-of-the-moment are better than those made after long contemplation. The link: American's no longer want to make choices. Here's the quotation I object to:

"This desire to completely control the environment has started to unravel in the past five years," he said.

The shock from the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in part explains that development, he said, but so do the billion Web sites and millions of blogs, tens of thousands of books in the store and hundreds of television channels. This cacophony, he said, has led the culture to the belief that, "You couldn't control all the choices; you couldn't control all the noise."

This is ridiculous. Humans have been indecisive for millenia. That is certainly not a product of the September 11 attacks. Terrorist attacks that killed some 3,000 people are invoked so casually by the author as to be deprived of all meaning. You could easily substitute "The invention of the remote control, which allows for easy and constant channel surfing, in part explains that development...", which only demonstrates the emptiness of the argument.

I just can't fathom how the September 11th attacks are linked to the iPod Shuffle. I'm sorry, NY Times, you lost me on this one.

Free Promotion!

2005-01-15T19:56:00.000-08:00

I'd like to direct readers' attention to an interesting new blog, loosely on economics, written by a close friend (and one of the smartest people around), Econoblog. That is not to be confused with an older blog of the same name, also written by an MIT alum (in that case, conservative economist Arnold Kling).

Here we go....

2005-01-14T01:48:00.000-08:00

For me, this is a very important post, so I will put it up in itss entirety. It is from the NY Times. Most in the US may not agree, but they do not understand.

Poland Exhumes the Skeletons in Its Communist Closet
By RICHARD BERNSTEIN

Published: January 14, 2005

ARSAW, Jan. 11 - During the heady days a decade and a half ago when democracy first came to Poland, few faces were more visible, or more emblematic of the democracy movement than the movie star-like spokeswoman for Solidarity, Malgorzata Niezabitowska. Certainly, she would be the last person anybody would suspect of having collaborated with the Communist government.

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But in the past few weeks, Ms. Niezabitowska - like numerous other Solidarity veterans - has been snared by allegations that under the code name Nowak she was a regular informer for the Communist security services. The allegation, supported by newly available documents from the Communist-era secret police, has both transfixed Poland and made a turmoil of Ms. Niezabitowska's life.

Among the former Communist countries of Eastern Europe, Poland is a relative latecomer to what has become know as lustration, so called because the bringing to light of secret Communist files may serve as a purifying sacrifice, a process that roiled countries like Germany, the Czech Republic and Hungary in the 1990's.

Several years ago, none other than Lech Walesa, a founder of Solidarity and Poland's first democratically elected president, was charged with having collaborated in the early 1970's. While he was cleared by the Polish Parliament, the taint on his reputation has remained.

But there has been a sharp increase here lately in lustration cases because, after years of delay, Poland only this month completed the process of opening its former Communist secret police archives to anybody who can claim to have been a target.

Just last week, Jozef Oleksy, a former prime minister, was forced to resign as speaker of the Polish Parliament after a court found he had lied about his past associations with Polish military intelligence. Mr. Oleksy denied that allegation and is appealing the court's ruling.

Mr. Oleksy is a former member of the Communist Party, but, in a strange paradox, many of the people whose past records are coming up for scrutiny are former leaders in the Solidarity movement. Among them are Marian Jurzczyk, the Solidarity leader of Szczecin and now the mayor of that city, and Zbigniew Nakder, a former head of the Polish language service of Radio Free Europe, and numerous Roman Catholic priests.

This has led some people here to wonder if the process is not harming the wrong people - former democracy activists rather than the many current government officials who were members of the very Communist Party that persecuted them.

"Lots of people signed something," said Helena Luczywo, the deputy editor of the newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza and a former democracy activist. "Lots of people said something to the police, because they were weak, or because they were blackmailed."

"It's all very complicated," Ms. Luczywo said, "but if you're young and didn't have this experience, it's difficult to understand."

While there have been a number of highly publicized disclosures lately, the accusation against Ms. Niezabitowska, which she denies, is the one that has riveted the country. She has admitted to speaking once to the Communist-era secret police, but said she refused to collaborate with them and, in any case, told them nothing they did not already know. She said that any documents in the files relating to anything other than that one meeting were fakes made by a secret police that routinely engaged in fabrications.

"Their attitude is that if the secret police wrote something, it must be true," Ms. Niezabitowska, 56, said of her accusers during a conversation at her home outside Warsaw. "But this is a fundamental misunderstanding. In the Communist time the core of the system was a lie and the system's executors were professionals. They knew very well how to make lies look like truth by mixing both in words and in documents.

"There was a special service inside the secret police called Office T that specialized in making false documents," she continued. "Sometimes they invented fake agents altogether, or they fabricated letters with compromising information."

But officials at the government bureau that keeps the documents and studies them argue that, while Ms. Niezabitowska's claim of forgery could theoretically be true - the issue is now before a special court - it is unlikely in this case, and that Ms. Niezabitowska does indeed have a past that she has, until now, refused to acknowledge publicly.

"To me the file of Malgorzata Niezabitowska is a standard file," said Pawel Machcewicz, a historian at the Institute for National Remembrance, which is the custodian of the vast records of Poland's Communist past. "I didn't see anything in it that makes it different from other files."

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Similarly, a well-known historian, Antoni Dudek, wrote recently in Gazeta Wyborcza, one of Poland's leading newspapers, "To accuse the special services of forging documents is absurd, because they would just have been cheating themselves."

Ms. Niezabitowska's case came up when another former member of Solidarity Weekly, Krzysztof Wyszkowski, examined his own files and learned that he had been informed on by a secret collaborator identified as Nowak. Researchers at the Institute of National Remembrance determined that Nowak was Ms. Niezabitowska, and Mr. Wyszkowski gave that information to the Polish press.

In the meantime, having learned that her file had turned up, Ms. Niezabitowska made a statement of her own to the press, in which she recounted her secret police experience.

She had one and only one meeting with the secret police, on Dec. 15, 1981, she said, shortly after martial law was declared, when she was picked up at her home, taken away and interrogated for six hours. She says that she gave some opinions about some of her fellow members of Solidarity Weekly, including Mr. Wyszkowski, whom she did not like.

To talk as much as she did, Ms. Niezabitowska has admitted, was an error. But, she says, she did not disclose information harmful to anybody, and she refused further cooperation. After that first involuntary meeting, she said, she never met with the secret police again.

She argues that what she was really doing in those days belies the accusation of collaboration. She and her husband, Tomasz Tomaszewski, a photographer, clandestinely documented scenes of martial law, taking pictures, for example, of tanks on the streets, and surreptitiously passing them to a Western diplomat who sent them abroad. There they were published, helping to counter the portrait being painted by the official propaganda, which was that Poland, free of the unrest caused by Solidarity's strikes and demonstrations, had once again become a happy, peaceful place. If Ms. Niezabitowska or Mr. Tomaszewski had been caught, she said, their crime would have been espionage, and they would have faced prison terms of at least 10 years, or possibly even the death penalty.

"So can you imagine how I feel about this now - that I was not a fighter for democracy, but was a petty collaborator with the secret police," Ms. Niezabitowska said. "I'm heartbroken, not just for me, but for Poland. I fear that the history of the Polish opposition and our struggle for freedom will now be the story as told by the secret police, by people who were our worst enemies and did everything to destroy us. It would be a real victory of the totalitarian system from its grave."

Mr. Machcewicz said that, having studied Ms. Niezabitowska's dossier, he believed the documents in it to be authentic. Her file, he said, consisted of 11 reports from her controller in the secret police. In one of them, for example, she appeared to provide information about a clandestine meeting of members of the underground Solidarity Weekly that took place in April 1982.

Ms. Niezabitowska's signature does not figure on the 11 reports of her handler, but it does appear on three separate documents, twice with her own name, once as Nowak. One signature appeared on a typed document, dated the day after she said she had her sole meeting with the secret police, in which she agreed to collaborate, for the sake of "avoiding bloodshed," in the words of the person who wrote the letter.

Mr. Machcewicz said that the police seemed to have some information about Ms. Niezabitowska, the exact nature of which he declined to disclose. "It's a complicated case," Mr. Machcewicz said of Ms. Niezabitowska, "of a person who was under strong pressure, who tried not to collaborate, but who nonetheless provided some valuable information."

The New Kremlinology

2005-01-04T11:50:00.000-08:00

A good measure of how far Russia under Putin has slipped back towards Soviet authoritarianism can be seen in how the West tends to analyze national politics. In the Yeltsin era of "crony capitalism", the tendency was to focus on the relative strengths -- who was rising and falling during any given period of time -- of the oligarchs, vis-a-vis each other and vis-a-vis the Kremlin.

Under Putin, the focus has returned to the Kremlin as opaque power center, and the enigmatic Putin is at the center of all the intrigue. Is he his own man? Is he merely the front man for some shadowy oligarch group? Or rather the front man for the old KGB apparat?

And so it comes as no surprise today to read the speculation that the apparent demotion of one of Putin's most outspoken (read: critical of the Kremlin) aides, Andrei Illarionov. The aide's sin: describing the YUKOS seizure and auction as "the swindle of the century". If anything, Illarionov is guilty of understatement, but that is neither here nor there.

Of course, coming as it does on the heels of the CIA purge (see previous posts) in the United States, we would seem to be in no position to critique Putin's handling of this situation.

Powers on CIA in NY Review of Books

2004-12-29T20:09:00.000-08:00

An extension of this morning's post: I just ran across an article (link to be provided later) by Thomas Powers in a back issue of the NY Review of Books, in which Powers dissects the Agency's troubles of late and speculates on Goss' gamble (Powers doesn't seem to think its going to end well for the CIA or for US national security).

Goss' Big Gamble

2004-12-29T10:31:00.000-08:00

So new CIA Director Porter Goss has asked a sixth senior official to step down, all part of a major Goss-led "restructuring" (not really, since the structure will remain the same, but it's bigger than a "housecleaning", in any case). The CIA is more resistant to change than most Washington institutions, and if we've learned anything over its 50-odd year history, it's that the CIA is not infallible. Far from it. So count me not among Goss' many detractors, for the moment.

But Goss is taking a huge risk, both personally (politically) and on behalf of our national security (that's my and your security he's messing with) and I am not sure he's fully conscious of it, since he's never come out and recognized that all of this transition at the top is going to filter down and affect the rank-and-file, and it's going to deprive the agency of a lot of its leadership capital -- people who understand the intelligence business, and particularly the nexus between intelligence and domestic politics.

I hope that Goss' handpicked crew is as good as he hopes, for the sake of our national security. But I'd like to see more of his crew in place before all these purges, rather than this rudderless period that the CIA is now experiencing.

Muddled WashPost Editorial Policy on Sudan

2004-12-27T09:09:00.000-08:00

The Washington Post seems to have its heart in the right place when it has come to the situation in Darfur, consistently calling for more international action to stem the violence. However, the paper -- perhaps fooling itself into thinking a more diplomatic position might influence American policy -- shows too much deference to the US position, which seems to be "speak loudly but put away that damn stick".

About six months ago, when US policy was about the same (speaking loudly, no real stick), and it looked like there might be some movement in the international community on Sudan (Annan's visit to the region, Colin Powell's visit, etc.), the WashPost penned this editorial on Darfur. To distill the message of the editorial down to a few lines: "nice job Bush administration, damn you Europeans for mucking it up based on your own self-interest. Oh, and the Bush administration shouldn't be afraid to go it alone here."

Today, after months of little movement on Darfur in the international arena, but plenty of preparations by the Sudanese parties for more violence, the Post has a new editorial line. The gist of today's Post position: "nice job Bush administration, damn you China and Russia for mucking it up based on your own self-interest. Oh, and the Bush administration shouldn't be afraid to go it alone here."

So, there is some admirable consistency in the Post position on the one hand: their unwillingness to concede that the Bush administration has done regrettably little to really address Darfur in the five months between the July and December editos. Instead, there was a US election, mounting troubles -- including an election to prepare for -- in Iraq, a busted election in Ukraine (prompting a mini-standoff with Russia), and a whole host of other issues that intervened to sap attention from the tragedy unfolding in Sudan.

But there is also a revealing inconsistency in the Post position. Six months ago, busting on Europe was still in vogue in the Bush administration, it seemed OK to blame Europe (and single out France, while you're at it, for bonus brownie points). Today, with no democratic candidate offering to repair relations with allies, the Bush administration has gone back to its neutral position of ignoring historic allies, so the Post has morphed its position from "Blame Europe" to a more timely "Blame Russia and China".

All of this is grand, but the problem is this: the positions of Europe, Russia and China have changed nary a bit in the past five months. NOR HAS THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES. There is plenty of blame to be passed around for the continuing disaster in Darfur. For the sake of logical consistency and objectivity, the Post would be better served by recognizing that the US government failed to heed its first call to act unilaterally on Sudan if the world community didn't. Instead, they've stuck with an editorial position on Sudan that makes it OK for the US to continue its policy of passive inaction (coupled with active rhetoric) while blaming the rest of the world for the inaction. That position neither pushes the Bush administration to change its policy, nor reflects the reality of the Sudan situation, which is that the whole of the international community is to blame, the US as much as anyone else (though the levels of culpability may be different -- ahh, nuance).

Sorting Through The YUKOS Mess

2004-12-24T09:50:00.000-08:00

More news on the Yuganskneftegaz auction: Putin announced (if there was ever any doubt that all oil business flows throught the Kremlin, it has been dispelled by the fact that every major announcement about this sordid affair -- from hints of the identity of Baikal Finance Group to the latest news -- has come straight from Putin) that state oil company Rosneft had acquired YUKOS mystery bidder Baikal Finance Group. By extension, of course, this means that Rosneft has the rights to Yuganskneftegaz. The problem, as I see it, is that Rosneft most definitely on its own does not have the cash to complete payment on the $9 billion bid. So it's going to need partners. Enter Gazprom. And Surgut. But first, a little background.

There have long been rumors of a plan afoot to renationalize a large part of the Russian oil sector under a new national company. Rosneft didn't actually start acquiring strength in the market until the past three years. Prior to that, the Russian oil sector was dominated by large "private" oil holdings -- YUKOS, LUKoil, TNK and Sibneft, primarily. The state companies never got to catch up on the five-ten year head start those other oligarch-backed companies had.

With Putin's rise to power, he brought with him a very influential advisor from Petersburg, Vladimir Litvinenko, the head of the St. Pete Institute of Oil and Gas. Litvinenko has been a strong advocate of the nationalization and strong state management of the oil and gas sector. (Litvinenko also has managed Putin's election campaigns in Petersburg, so you know their tight; oh, and I think he also advised his doctoral thesis, but you get the point). In any case, in Putin's cadre of insideres, there has long been a push for greater state influence in oil and gas.

Until the Yuganskneftegaz auction last week, it looked like Putin's team was planning to roll Rosneft and the newly acquired Yugansk unit into Gazprom's as-yet only-formed-on-paper oil production subsidiary, Gazpromneft. Shortly after the auction, won of course by BFG and distinctly lost by Gazprom, the sale of the Gazpromneft unit was announced. Gazprom said it was to avoid legal repercussions from YUKOS. I call bull%#it on that one. No legal repercussions for Gazprom if there was no sale to Gazprom. It simply doesn't make sense.

With Rosneft stepping in to take over BFG from Surgut, Rosneft Pres Sergey Bogdanchikov put himself right in a position to have his company gain a dominant role in the new state oil company. Gazprom will have to take orders in this regard from Rosneft. A strong move by Bogdanchikov. Surgut likely will retain a sizeable share in the Yugansk unit -- up to 20% I've heard -- while Putin has also mentioned that the Chinese will be involved in the project. And if we've learned anything over the course of his presendency, it's that when Putin "hints" or "suggests" that something might happen, it's _going to happen_. Bet on it.

So here's the way things are shaping up on Yugansk: Rosneft takes the lead role in the formation of a new state oil company, with Gazprom coming in to offer sizeable financial support. Regarding Yuganskneftegas specifically, Surgut stays in the background, profiting off of its timely assistance (through Baikal Finance Group) of the government to buy time after the US court ruling. And enter the dragon, China National Petroleum Company, which will snap up a nice-sized share in the Yugansk unit. I see the figures maybe breaking down this way: 15-20% Surgut, 25%-30% CNPC, 55% "Rosprom". The new national company probably retains operatorship, or if it doesn't want the hassle, retains a large enough share to veto any decisions by the operator.

All of this activity has been confused over the past week because there have been two dynamics at play. First, there has been the struggle within the Russian state oil and gas sector for control over the future of the new state oil company. For the moment, Rosneft has played that game deftly, while Gazprom has been outmaneuvered by both Surgut and Rosneft. On another level, there has been a conscious attempt by Gazprom and the Putin administration to "muddy the waters" to make legal pursuit of the final owners of Yuganskneftegaz impossible. This is one reason the Chinese are being brought in. China has plenty of cash to help fund the project, so there are no worries about Western banks and financing. Second, China represents almost infinite demand, so even the impact of a western boycott on Yugansk or Russian state oil company oil, if such a move were possible, would be lessened. Of course, such a move is next to impossible, as Putin's visit to Germany this week reminded us, because Gazprom holds the gas future of Europe in its palm. So not a great time to be a Group Menatep investor right now.

Here's an interesting take, comprehensive enough for the uninitiated, from leading Russian business paper (and fairly independent paper, to boot) Kommersant.

Putin Unhinged

2004-12-23T22:39:00.000-08:00

If the translation in this BBC story is accurate, we seem to be witnessing an increasingly paranoid and isolated Russian President.

Most eye-catching -- eye-popping even -- was this comment (after a discussion of his views of the democratic transitions taking place in Ukraine and Georgia):

"If you have permanent revolutions you risk plunging the post-Soviet space into
endless conflict," he said.
He said he hoped isolating Russia was not the
goal of US policy.
"If it's indeed so, then the position on Chechnya is
becoming more understandable. That means that there, as well, a policy aimed at
creating elements that would destabilise the Russian Federation is being
conducted," he added.

This quote is really revealing, insofar as Putin has been reluctant to come out and really espouse this anti-US view in the past, though we've long known that many of his KGB-shiki advisors hold it. Of course, US policy is not to "create elements that would destabilize the Russian Federation". Putin's administration, and the preceding Yeltsin administration, creates enough destabilizing forces in places like Chechnya through its own policies.

But coming just days after George Bush again defended "his friend" Vladimir, Putin has made himself look bad and made Bush look even worse.

Putin is isolated. His circle is tiny, and they're all paranoid. My fear is that Russia only looks stable right now. The only consolation, really, is that by pursuing a US-style tax cutting strategy over the past three years, Putin has effectively "starved the beast", as Paul Krugman would say, to the point where the Russian security services can no longer operate (at least, not in their present state) as a true authoritarian monolith.

Update: more of Putin's enlightened thoughts can be found in this AP piece.

More Russian Corruption News

2004-12-20T18:07:00.000-08:00

With theYUKOS/Baikal Finance Group story still developing, I thought I'd point you all to an interesting side story -- the jury conviction of Harvard Professor Andrei Schleifer for using insider information to cash in on the Russian securities market he was helping develop in the mid-1990s. Schleifer has long claimed he wasn't limited by the conflict-of-interest rules that typically constrain such advisors -- a claim that was belied by his own actions (putting the money in accounts in his wife's father's name or some such machination, if I recall correctly). In any case, I've long considered Schleifer a case study in American hubris in dealing with Russia in the 1990s: we'd go over, rightfully lecture them on corruption, but those delivering the lectures were from one of the most "corrupt" (in the American sense: that is, rife with favoratism and insiderism, not replete with bribery and cruder forms of corruption exhibited in other nations) bodies in the American bureaucracy -- the foreign aid department USAID.

Let me be clear: a lot of good people work for USAID. But in my experience, a lot of unqualified people do too, and moreover it is consistently one of the most mismanaged agencies in goverenment. For an example of how seriously we take management in international development. Andrew Natsios, head of USAID, once oversaw the "Big Dig" in Boston -- a project whose expense inflated about 10-fold after cost-overruns and various contracting scandals. Natsios was dispatched from that job after allegedly signing off on one-too-many sweetheart arrangements with the engineering and construction firm Bechtel. That did not stop the Bush adminstration from tapping Natsios to head USAID. And once he arrived at USAID, the first big deal Natsios had to handle was the "reconstruction" of Iraqi infrastructure. And who got the biggest, fattest construction contract -- when bidding was essentially restricted to American companies only (some Brits need apply as well)? Bechtel. This of course isn't proof positive that it was a bad deal, but those early Iraq contracts weren't the paragon of transparent governance either. And USAID is, along with the State Department, the one agency in American government that is constantly hectoring foreign governments on transparency. You can see how this looks bad for us.

So back to Schleifer -- he seems like a creep, and he got his due. But what was Harvard doing defending him to last?

Mystery Bidder

2004-12-19T16:05:00.000-08:00

So Baikal Finance Group, a heretofore unknown entity, bids $9.3 billion, to buy the main production unit of YUKOS in the state-run auction yesterday. They beat out Gazprom, who lost its western bank financing after a Houston court cast doubt upon the legality of the firesale. And BFG slapped down a $1.3 billion non-refundable down payment. So who is BFG?

This Washington Post piece provides one interesting tidbit of circumstantial evidence. BFG lists its offices in Tver, just down the street from a subsidiary of Surgutneftegas, the only Russian company that I've heard of that was 1) interested in bidding on the Yugansk unit and 2) had some $8 billion in spare cash lying around (from what, it's unclear). So we can't rule out Surgut involvement.

Interestingly, if BFG somehow finds itself unable to pay the remainder of its bid in the next 14 days, then the stake in Yugansk get transferred back to the state, and it's up for auction again, probably.

So what happens from here? My best guess: BFG (we'll just assume its Surgut) "offers" to sell Gazprom part of its share, either before or after closing in 14 days. Surgut makes a little money, gets a nice little piece of this big producer (as big a producer as Qatar) and Gazprom gets control of the asset everyone assumes it will get in the end anyway. In this scenario, Surgut is acting as a sort of "white knight"; it steps in and bails out the Russian government and Gazprom from a sticky situation with western creditors, and yet allows their preferred outcome to prevail. Surgut wins, Gazprom wins, the Government wins, and YUKOS still loses.

Another possibility: BFG defaults, but the 14-day window gives Gazprom and whoever else (Surgut or Rosneft could play a role here) time to organize their finances to make a new bid in round 2.

Two things are clear: 1) this couldn't have happened without the Kremlin OKing it. And 2) whoever is behind BFG just acquired a whole, potentially lucrative, chunk of goodwill from the Kremlin.

Update: according to this article in the the NY Times, either one of my scenarios could be right. Chris Weafer of Alfa Bank, whose opinion I would trust highly in these matters, has this to say:

"The surprise winning bidder in today's auction, Baikal Finance Group, is either a front for Gazprom or a state-friendly company like Surgutneftegaz or Sibneft or a combination of state and state-friendly interests."

In case you were wondering...

2004-12-17T19:09:00.000-08:00

...there's still a crisis in Darfur. And it's apparently about to get worse.

Now, I don't place a whole lot of faith in the "international community" to do the right thing by humanity in general. Let's face it, the "international community" is no more than the nation-state equivalent of a high school class: a bunch of personalities, thrown together, all working on similar assignments, but fundamentally mostly at odds with each other and driven to petty disputes. Sure, most people pretend to be friends in the yearbook, but on a day-to-day basis, it's dog-eat-dog.

So I'm not surprised we can't get our $h!t together to save a lot of lives and ease a lot of suffering. But that doesn't mean I can't still be disappointed.

FT on Yukos

2004-12-17T07:52:00.000-08:00

Much news coming out about the pending Yukos auction, just days away. The Financial Times offers this brief but important commentary, which is revealing as to the relative financial weakness of even such Russian big-name heavy-hitters as Gazprom, the relative financial strength of darkhorses like Surgutneftegaz, and the relative nervousness in the western financial community with regards to Russia.

Bad Day for Rumsfeld

2004-12-15T08:48:00.000-08:00

When big-time Washington insider and neo-con pooh-bah Bill Kristol calls you out as a failure on the op-ed page of the Post, you know your days in the club might be numbered.

How To Make An "Honest" Threat Assessment

2004-12-14T18:06:00.000-08:00

Fascinating article in Foreign Affairs from Selig Harrison, a guy who knows better than to f#$k around with threat assessment (unlike some other people I can think of). Yet Harrison's point reveals, better than they themselves can elucidate, the dilemma facing American policy-makers. A threat assessment should always include the worst-case scenario. To present that as a likely (as opposed to remote) possibility is of course the greatest flaw of the Bush administration's approach to foreign policy. However, to get other nations to take it seriously, the Bush administration needs to impress on them the need for proactive action (lest we end up with Bosnia-like results). It's long been clear that the dominant movement in international foreign policy is, in fact, inertia. Only when they are shamed (see, Bosnia), or provoked (see, Iraq circa 1991), are nations moved to collective action. The Bush administration is trying an extension of the shame route: alarm. It's not working so well. But it's the closest thing to a strategy that I can see from this administration in foreign policy as I've been able to glean.

A Story That Should Run In Every Paper In America

2004-12-09T19:52:00.000-08:00

Post-election 2004, much was made of blue-staters alleged disdain for "Middle American" values. Anyone who thinks that there is a major cultural divide in America (and I suspect it is as many red-staters as blue-staters), and anyone who thinks that their local values are somehow superior to those in another locality, should read this article in the NY Times.

Much of the liberal media (not the media in general, but the actual "liberal" or "progressive" media) has been astir because of Peter Beinart's recent challenge to liberals to toughen up on terrorism ("A Fighting Faith", the cover story in The New Republic last week). This has led to much internecine fighting among democratic pundits (atrios, Matt Yglesias, and Kevin Drum have all chipped in). That's cool. Good discussion guys. But I think they all should redirect their attention for a moment to men and women like Christian Engeldrum. Tough policy on terrorism (and the Republicans seem to understand this better than the Democracts right now) requires some human sacrifice. To date, the Republicans have successfully convinced the American people that the war on terrorism (which has now been hopelessly conflated with the war on Iraq, so to make a distinction is purely academic -- most people just don't follow you) is worth losing good men like Christian Engeldrum. It matters not a whit what position the "Democratic Party" takes on the war on terrorism/Iraq. There can be many. What matters is that the American people believe that the Democrats will handle business in matters of national security better than Republicans. At times, Beinart's "we need to get tougher" strategy will be appropriate. At other times, it won't. Democrats need to stop thinking in terms of political positioning, and start appealing to hearts and minds (or, as one of my favorite bloggers Publius calls it: pathos -- as opposed to logos). Because at the end of the day, its our friends, our family members who go off to die in these faraway lands. And we need to feel they're doing good for us; we don't need to know it.

Ukraine Thoughts

2004-12-05T20:12:00.000-08:00

I apologize for the recent absences. I was traveling over Thanksgiving and my law school exam period is just getting underway, so things will be a little light until around Christmas.

I have many thoughts about the Ukraine election, none of them terribly original, I'm afraid. It has been inspiring to see Ukrainians out in the streets of Kiev. I feel wonderful for them, and I am so happy to see a Soviet people seizing control of its own destiny. I hope that the Russian political opposition is taking notes.

Speaking of Russia, Putin's role in the denouement of the whole Ukrainian election has been scandalous, and should put to rest any further debate as to the man's democratic political skills. He has none. Any time he has tried to martial public opinion (in his own country or elsewhere) he has proven to be incredibly ham-handed. He is an organization-builder, but he's not a popular politician. And the Russian position on Ukraine has revealed the survival of the Russian cold war mentality that every international event boils down to a battle for primacy with the United States. Like France, Russia too often reflexively adopts the anti-American position solely for the reason that it is the anti-American position to be considered a true ally. That's not to say that Russia and the United States cannot or will not continue to work closely together on many issues. It's just that the possibility of any true alliance in the foreseeable future has been foreclosed by the clear lack of trust on the Russian side.

The Bush administration hasn't come out looking much better than Putin on this one. Here is one of their best chances to support a peaceful democratic transition in a corner of the world marked by autocracies, and given the chance to shout down the opponents of "freedom" and "democracy" rather than shoot them down, the United States has let its recently retired Secretary of State be its most forceful spokesperson. If we want the world to take our democracy and freedom rhetoric seriously, we have to be a bit more serious in our application of it -- even when it requires rebuking a sometimes-ally (Russia) we'd rather not rebuke.

YUKOS, Again

2004-11-20T17:22:00.000-08:00

As the American voter demonstrates in election after election, never underestimate a person/country's ability to act against its economic interest. In this case, it's Russia, which this week announced the sale of the principal unit of oil giant YUKOS. The tiny little problem, of course, is that Russia doesn't actually own YUKOS. It wants to sell a company it doesn't own in order to get back taxes it alleges the company evaded. And of course to settle any remaining political scores with former YUKOS wunderkind founder Mikhail Khodorkovsky (who now sits in Moscow's Lyubyanka prison, once the center of the KGB) and any other "oligarchs" who might decide to moonlight in opposition politics, as Khodorkovsky often did.

YUKOS president, Steven Theede called the proposed sale of Yugansk "a government-organised theft to settle a political score." Theede noted that the sale violates Russian tax law, which stipulates that non-core assets should be disposed of first to settle back tax bills. But the Russian government long ago made clear legality is not at the center of the YUKOS case.

So what next for Russia and for YUKOS? Major YUKOS shareholder Menatep looks like it's about to go nuclear by bringing the case to international arbitration. Investors in authoritarian places (Russia now falls under that category) hate to go international as it often spoils relations with the host government (not a good long-term idea, of course, in a strong and arbitrary state system). But the sheer scale of YUKOS makes it too valuable to let slip away without a serious fight, or at least some serious reparations for all the shareholders who are getting screwed in this little Russian gov't-Khodorkovsky death match. No foreign oil company will go near the YUKOS unit up for sale next month -- they have no idea how much it's really worth, and in light of what's happened to the last owners, they're probably a little antsy about taking on that kind of baggage.

Russian officials have said that a consortium of Russian companies could be the answer, because no Russian company alone could afford the government's approx USD 10 B asking price. (One should note straight off that realistically, given all the drama, the Yugansk unit will likely fetch about half of its worth -- YUKOS officials say its value is USD 20 B, Russian officials say about half that). I'm not sure it's the price will determine the outcome. I believe the Russian government would prefer two major state-friendly (if not wholly state-owned) oil companies to one. And I think at least two major Russian companies are interested in the Yugansk unit -- LUKoil and state-owned Rosneft. So the likely outcome, from my perspective, will be a LUKoil-Rosneft consortium, possibly with a smaller third company thrown in there for fun. I haven't heard much about Sibneft's interest. Sibneft was, if you'll recall, supposed to merge with YUKOS but called it off just as the latter's legal troubles began. At that time, it seemed Sibneft was more keen on being the acquired rather than the acquiring party. That may still hold true.

To be continued...

Contest!

2004-11-18T22:26:00.000-08:00

Everyone's favorite autocrat (here at the Tacitus Project, anyway), Turkmenistan's Saparmurat Niyazov ("the Turkmenbashi"), has announced a great new contest. While the golden statue of himself that rotates to face the sun in the capital is OK, the Turkmenbashi (which translates "father of all Turkmen") is tired of all the nice things his state-run media says about him. So, according to RFE/RL, he's setting up some incentives to see that the media pay less attention to him (see story at end of post). How self-effacing.

In the spirit of the Turkmenbashi's offer, I would like to announce a competition among Tacitus Project readers. The first person _not_ to mention glowingly the Tacitus Project wins. And the grand prize is... my thanks! In the alternative, we suggest you compose epic and lyrical poetry praising us instead. Thank you.

TURKMEN PRESIDENT LAUNCHES CONTEST AMONG TV OFFICIALS TO SEE WHO PRAISES HIM LEAST
Saparmurat Niyazov announced on 16 June that he is launching a competition among the directors of the three state television channels to determine who praised him the least, turkmenistan.ru and the Moscow-based Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations reported on 18 June. First prize in the contest is Niyazov's thanks. In announcing the contest, Niyazov complained about what he called the excessive television coverage of him and his activities, and the excessive praise heaped on him. He said he is tired of looking at his own portrait and that the focus of television coverage on him demonstrates the low professional level of broadcast journalists. He suggested that songs based on his poems should be broadcast instead, along with reports on what Turkmenistan has achieved since obtaining its independence. Niyazov has regularly voiced similar complaints about his personality cult for at least the last five years, but they have consistently resulted in an intensification, rather than a reduction, of that cult. BB

Well, That Settles That...

2004-11-18T22:15:00.000-08:00

The North Koreans say that portraits of Kim Jong-Il are not being taken down. To do so would be "like trying to remove the sun from the sky", says a foreign ministry spokesman. Awesome.

Something To Keep An Eye On...

2004-11-16T20:26:00.000-08:00

This NY Times story is pretty fascinating. "Kremlinology" used to be a favorite sport among western Sovietologists, who would base their predictions on whose stock was up or down in the opaque Communist regime by who was seated closest to -- or absent from -- Soviet military parades. Kim Jong Il portrait-spotting seems to be an adapted version of that game, and a fun one at that. If there was a coup, I would have expected more noise from whoever is now calling the shots. But the whole North Korean regime is so secretive, you never really know.

Falluja Update

2004-11-15T22:08:00.000-08:00

The final outcome of the Falluja assault is still not clear. To be sure, we take the city. But at what cost to us, in lives and Iraqi goodwill? And at what cost to the Iraqi insurgency?

My first proposed scenario -- that the whole build-up was an elaborate feint meant to expose the insurgents' position -- obviously didn't pan out, which tripped off the back-up scenario: the insurgents took advantage of the lead time to shift their bases of operations slightly and now continue to wreak havoc across the Sunni triangle and even up into the Kurdish areas.

I am troubled by some of the semantics being tossed around concerning the Iraqi insurgency. The American military -- and to a certain extent, the media -- refers to all Iraqi insurgents as "terrorists". Perhaps this is so, in the sense that they inspire terror in the hearts of some of the Iraqi population. But at least some of the Iraqi population sympathizes with or openly supports these "terrorists", and the insurgents don't seem to be making a point of terrorizing Iraqis (targeting mainly foreigners -- who are unfortunately universally deemed occupiers -- for attacks). The issue is not whether these fighters are brutal or not, or whether their brutality is somehow honorable or justified. The issue is about providing an honest assessment of the enemy we face.

The problems with the semantics are manifold. First of all, among the American public, "terrorists" signals suicide bombers and al Qaeda. Sure, some of the insurgents in Iraq are suicide bombers. But many are also like guerilla fighters. So "terrorist" doesn't begin to describe the complex composition of our enemies. Secondly, terrorists by definition use "terror" as a way to cow an opposing force into surrendering a position or, more often, altering a policy. Some of our enemies in Iraq are using terror tactics (the bombings at Iraqi police stations, the kidnappings and executions). But many others are fighting a typical partisan war, attacking the supply lines and soft underbelly of an occupation force.

My concern over the semantics goes to a deeper problem: we can't possibly devise a strategy to "win" (and by win, I mean secure a lasting peace) in Iraq if we are in denial as to the identity of our opponents.

Unsolicited Advice

2004-11-06T03:24:00.000-08:00

As a pro-choice person -- if the Republicans want to reignite the national debate about a woman's right to control access to her own body -- let them. Time -- and more importantly the voting majority -- is not on their side.

So Much For The Element Of Surprise

2004-11-05T16:02:00.000-08:00

All signs point to an imminent US assault on Fallujah. Or so the US media has been reporting for the past few weeks.

I suppose now is as good a time as any to deal with this hornet's nest; but it seems that giving the insurgents a few weeks to gear up for a major battle -- or, alternatively, to surrepticiously get out of the city and shift their operational base elsewhere -- is not such a hot idea, tactically. So I remain a little skeptical as to whether this assault will indeed go off, and if it does, whether it will be terribly useful.

Time will tell. In the meantime, pray for the Marines and for the innocents of Fallujah.

Defector Defect

2004-11-04T01:36:00.000-08:00

Interesting story from the NY Times on yesterday's speedy trial of Charles Robert Jenkins, the American sergeant who walked across the border from South Korea into North Korea in 1965, ostensibly to avoid service in Vietnam.

Jenkins was given a 30-day jail sentence, dishonorably discharged and stripped of 40 years of back pay and benefits. While Jenkins' crime was very serious, from the standpoint of military discipline, the punishment seems to fit when you consider that the man is 64, already ailing and had to live in North Korea, the latter prompting his lawyer to suggest he'd "already suffered 40 years of confinement."

More interesting, from a political standpoint, was this passage, a mixture of fact and inference, in the Times article:

...[T]he trial and sentencing seemed to reflect American political needs to mollify Japanese public opinion, which has been moved by the drama of the American defector from North Carolina and his Japanese wife, Hitomi Soga Jenkins, whom he met in North Korea a few years after North Korean agents had kidnapped her from a Japanese island in 1978.
Apparently to minimize American media attention, the one-day military trial took place as votes were being counted in the American presidential election.
Massaging Japanese public opinion is important to Washington, which wants to move the Army's First Corps from the state of Washington to this base, already
the headquarters of the United States Army in Japan. By receiving a 30-day
sentence, Private Jenkins is now detained in Japan, avoids return to the United
States for incarceration, and can receive weekly visits from his Japanese wife
and their two North Korean-born daughters.
To further soften Japanese opinion, military officers gave a slide show of the detention facility, which is on a United States Navy installation at Yokosuka. Drawing oohs and aahs from Japanese reporters, the slides showed rows of exercise bicycles, a living room-style visitation room, and close-ups of the food, including a large photo
of a slice of pumpkin pie with whipped cream on top.

First of all, I love the image of the oohing and ahhing Japanese reporters at the sight of a photo of a slice of pumpkin pie with whipped cream. Just great detail there.

But more seriously, we Americans like to brag that our judicial branch is isolated from politics and political pressure. This goes doubly for the military judiciary, which is nearly totally shielded from the public eye. But reporter James Brooke does a pretty good job of documenting, through the various accomodations made by military folks at and around the trial, that in fact political considerations loomed large in this case, and very likely affected the outcome, at least as regards the light sentence. I'm not saying categorically that political influence on the judiciary are necessarily a bad thing, merely that denying political influence in that regard is a facile conceit.

On the other hand, I would have liked to have seen some evidence for Brooke's claim that the trial took place on election day in the United States in order to minimize U.S. media attention. On its face, the claim doesn't make much sense. First of all, it's not clear to me that there ever was much U.S. media attention on Jenkins' plight. And a cursory look at some of the brief press coverage that there was doesn't show to me any indication that press coverage cut any particular way or would have aroused any particular reaction in the American public. Brooke seems to imply that American media attention in the Jenkins trial would either be negative, or it would arouse a negative reaction among the public (hence the gov't would want to keep the trial from public view). I think he needs to produce evidence to support that assertion (if that is, in fact, the assertion he is making), or, alternatively, he needs to be more clear on why the U.S. would want to minimize American media attention.

BBC on International Reaction to Bush Victory

2004-11-04T01:17:00.000-08:00

Here is some good analysis from several BBC reporters on reactions around the world to George Bush's re-election this week.

International reactions are decidedly mixed; in government, Bush is considered at least a "known entity". He's considered to be compromised as well, as he's still looking, in theory at least, for a lot of international support for the war in Iraq and the war on terror more broadly. Bush has now staked a substantial part of his legacy on his ability to bring democracy to Iraq and Afghanistan and win the war on terror and all are going to require long-term US commitment. If Kerry was elected and things went bad on those fronts, he could have played it off as "Bush's mess". Bush now owns Iraq and Afghanistan and the war on terror (as issues, not literally, people), and it will be all on him to see that they don't fail.

Among the general populations around the world, Bush has generally been unpopular for the past few years, so his election was not so welcomed.

But it is cause for some alarm that some of the warmest reactions to Bush's victory came from some of our most authoritarian partners -- Russia and China (Putin in particular) seemed pretty stoked about four more years. With the exception of Silvio Berlusconi in Italy, European leaders seem more tentative. Arab leaders are, of course, not so psyched. That generally doesn't trouble me too terribly much, except that it further hurts the chances that the U.S. will ever regain a reputation as a fair broker in the region.

For Those Looking For An Easy Way Out...

2004-11-03T14:57:00.000-08:00

...A few helpful tips from Harper's Magazine. Reprinted in entirety from www.harpers.org. Happy planning!

Electing to Leave
A reader’s guide to expatriating on November 3
Posted on Wednesday, November 3, 2004. Originally from Harper's Magazine, October 2004. By Bryant Urstadt.
Sources
So the wrong candidate has won, and you want to leave the country. Let us consider your options.

Renouncing your citizenship
Given how much the United States as a nation professes to value freedom, your freedom to opt out of the nation itself is surprisingly limited. The State Department does not record the annual number of Americans renouncing their citizenship—“renunciants,” as they are officially termed—but the Internal Revenue Service publishes their names on a quarterly basis in the Federal Register. The IRS’s interest in the subject is, of course, purely financial; since 1996, the agency has tracked ex-Americans in the hopes of recouping tax revenue, which in some cases may be owed for up to ten years after a person leaves the country. In any event, the number of renunciants is small. In 2002, for example, the Register recorded only 403 departures, of which many (if not most) were merely longtime resident aliens returning home.
The most serious barrier to renouncing your citizenship is that the State Department, which oversees expatriation, is reluctant to allow citizens to go “stateless.” Before allowing expatriation, the department will want you to have obtained citizenship or legal asylum in another country—usually a complicated and expensive process, if it can be done at all. Would-be renunciants must also prove that they do not intend to live in the United States afterward. Furthermore, you cannot renounce inside U.S. borders; the declaration must be made at a consul’s office abroad.
Those who imagine that exile will be easily won would do well to consider the travails of Kenneth Nichols O’Keefe. An ex-Marine who was discharged, according to his website, under “other than honorable conditions,” O’Keefe has tried officially to renounce his citizenship twice without success, first in Vancouver and then in the Netherlands. His initial bid was rejected after the State Department concluded that he would return to the United States—a credible inference, as O’Keefe in fact had returned immediately. After his second attempt,
O’Keefe waited seven months with no response before he tried a more sensational approach. He went back to the consulate at The Hague, retrieved his passport, walked outside, and lit it on fire. Seventeen days later, he received a letter from the State Department informing him that he was still an American, because he had not obtained the right to reside elsewhere. He had succeeded only in breaking the law, since mutilating a passport is illegal. It says so right on the passport.

Heading to Canada or Mexico
In your search for alternate citizenship, you might naturally think first of Canada and Mexico. But despite the generous terms of NAFTA, our neighbors to the north and south are, like us, far more interested in the flow of money than of persons. Canada, in particular, is no longer a paradise awaiting American dissidents: whereas in 1970 roughly 20,000 Americans became permanent residents of Canada, that number has dropped over the last decade to an average of just about 5,000. Today it takes an average of twenty-five months to be accepted as a permanent resident, and this is only the first step in what is likely to be a five-year process of becoming a citizen. At that point the gesture of expatriation may already be moot, particularly if a sympathetic political party has since resumed power.
Mexico’s citizenship program is equally complicated. Seniors should know that the country does offer a lenient program for retirees, who may essentially stay as long as they want. But you will not be able to work or to vote, and, more important, you must remain an American for at least five years.

France
Should one candidate win, those who opposed the Iraq war might hope to find refuge in France, where a very select few are allowed to “assimilate” each year. Assimilation is reserved for persons of non-French descent who are able to prove that they are more French than American, having mastered the language as well as the philosophy of the French way of life. Each case is determined on its own merit, and decisions are made by the Ministère de l’Emploi, du Travail, et de la Cohésion Social. When your name is published in the Journal Officiel de la République Français, you are officially a citizen, and may thereafter heckle the United States with authentic Gallic zeal.

The coalition of the willing
Should the other candidate win, war supporters might naturally look to join the coalition of the willing. But you may find a willing and developing nation as difficult to join as an unwilling and developed one. It takes at least five years to become a citizen of Pakistan, for instance, unless one marries into a family, and each applicant for residency in Pakistan is judged on a case-by-case basis. Uzbekistan imposes a five-year wait as well, with an additional twist: the nation does not recognize dual citizenship, and so you will be required to renounce your U.S. citizenship first. Given Uzbekistan’s standard of living (low), unemployment (high), and human-rights record (poor), this would be something of a leap of faith.

The Caribbean
A more pleasant solution might be found in the Caribbean. Take, for example, the twin-island nation of St. Kitts and Nevis, which Frommer’s guide praises for its “average year-round temperature of 79°F (26°C), low humidity, white-sand beaches, and unspoiled natural beauty.” Citizenship in this paradise can be purchased outright. Prices start at around $125,000, which includes a $25,000 application fee and a minimum purchase of $100,000 in bonds. Processing time, which includes checks for criminal records and HIV, can take up to three months, but with luck you could be renouncing by Inauguration Day. The island of Dominica likewise offers a program of “economic citizenship,” though it should be noted that Frommer’s describes the beaches as “not worth the effort to get there.”
Speed is of the essence, however, because your choice of tropical paradises is fast dwindling: similar passport-vending programs in Belize and Grenada have been shut down since 2001 under pressure from the State Department, which does not approve. In any case, it should be noted that under the aforementioned IRS rules, you might well be forced to continue subsidizing needless invasions—or, to be evenhanded, needless afterschool programs.

Indian reservations
Our Native American reservations, which enjoy freedom from state taxation and law enforcement, might seem an ideal home for the political exile. But becoming a citizen of a reservation is difficult—one must prove that one is a descendant of a member of the original tribal base roll—and moreover would be, as a gesture of political disaffection, largely symbolic. Reservations remain subject to federal law; furthermore, citizens of a reservation hold dual citizenships, and as such are expected to vote in U.S. elections and to live with the results.

The high seas
You might consider moving yourself offshore. At a price of $1.3 million you can purchase an apartment on The World, a residential cruise ship that moves continuously, stopping at ports from Venice to Zanzibar to Palm Beach. Again, however, your expatriation would be only partial: The World flies the flag of the Bahamas, but its homeowners, who hail from all over Europe, Asia, and the United States, retain citizenship in their home nations.
To obtain a similar result more cheaply, you can simply register your own boat under a flag of convenience and float it outside the United States’ 230-mile zone of economic control. There, on your Liberian tanker, you will essentially be an extension of that African nation, subject only to its laws, and may imagine yourself free of oppressive government.

Micronations
The boldest approach is to start a nation of your own. Sadly, these days it is essentially impossible to buy an uninhabited island and declare it a sovereign nation: virtually every rock above the waterline is now under the jurisdiction of one principality or another. But efforts have been made to build nations on man-made structures or on reefs lying just below the waterline. Among the more successful of these is the famous Principality of Sealand, which was founded in 1967 on an abandoned military platform off the coast of Britain. The following year a British judge ruled that the principality lay outside the nation’s territorial waters. New citizenships in Sealand, however, are not being granted or sold at present.
A less fortunate attempt was made in 1972, when Michael Oliver, a Nevada businessman, built an island on a reef 260 miles southwest of Tonga. Hiring a dredger, he piled up sand and mud until he had enough landmass to declare independence for his “Republic of Minerva.” Unfortunately, the Republic of Minerva was soon invaded by a Tongan force, whose number is said to have included a work detail of prisoners, a brass band, and Tonga’s 350-pound king himself. The reef was later officially annexed by the kingdom.
More recently, John J. Prisco III, of the Philippines, has declared himself the prince of the Principality of New Pacific, and announced that he has discovered a suitable atoll in the international waters of the Central Pacific. As of publication, the principality has yet to begin the first phase of construction, but it is already accepting applications for citizenship.

Imaginary nations
Perhaps the most elegant solution is to join a country that exists only in one’s own—or someone else’s—imagination. Many such virtual nations can be found on the Internet, and citizenships in them are easy to acquire. This, in fact, was the route most recently attempted by Kenneth Nichols O’Keefe, the unfortunate ex-Marine. In February 2003,
O’Keefe went to Baghdad to serve as a human shield, traveling with a passport issued to him by the “World Service Authority,” an outfit based in Washington, D.C., that has dubbed more than 1.2 million people “world citizens.” While laying over in Turkey, however, he was detained; Turkey, as it turns out, does not recognize the World Service Authority. O’Keefe was forced to apply for a replacement U.S. passport from the State Department, which rather graciously complied.
Upon his arrival in Baghdad, O’Keefe promptly set the replacement passport on fire. But he remains, to his dismay, an American.

This is Electing to Leave, originally from October 2004, published Wednesday, November 3, 2004. It is part of Features, which is part of Harpers.org.

Ukraine's "Crucial" Election

2004-10-31T16:15:00.000-08:00

The Economist and Washington Post, in editorials here (subscription required) and here, tried valiantly to attract mainstream western attention to this weekend's presidential election in Ukraine. Unfortunately, to make their point, both publications resorted to breathless exaggerations, calling Ukrainian vote "nearly as important for the world as America's" (Economist) and "a presidential vote of enormous importance not only for their own country but for the future of Europe." (The Post)

Really, the Ukrainian vote is interesting, but it's not important. That's because Ukraine was lost to the West years ago, even before it descended into abject obscurity under the current corrupt and incompetent president, Leonid Kuchma. In can be plausibly argued that, despite its large geographic size, 50-million strong population and location at the crossroads of Europe and Russia, Ukraine became more or less irrelevant when it returned the Soviet nuclear arsenal on its territory to Russia in the early 1990s.

In the immediate aftermath of the dramatic disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1992, analysts and journalists hoped out loud that Ukraine would become the big, pro-western influence in the former Soviet geospace and counterweight to Russian hegemony in the region. That may have been a reasonable hope at the time. In 2004, several manipulated elections and years of economic decline and inept rule later, to hope for anything more than a modest turnaround in Ukraine's fortunes -- as the Economist and Post clearly do -- represents an stubborn unwillingness to confront the reality of the past ten years in that country.

John McCain earlier this month weighed in with his view, a more sensible take, writing the "importance of this election lies not so much in the candidate selected but rather in its indication of whether Ukraine will continue down a democratic path." Even McCain plays it a little fast and loose when he says "continue down a democratic path" -- it's been clear for quite some time that democracy in the Ukraine is defined quite differently than in the West -- but at least McCain doesn't try to impose a larger significance to the Ukrainian election than is reasonable, nor does he ascribe a larger role to the country than should be be expected of it. If only the Economist and Post writers took McCain's more diplomatic and realistic tack, realizing that the ultimate import of the Ukrainian election lies in the benefits democratic rule in that country confers on its citizens, not in any collateral benefits to European and American foreign-policy makers.

RudePundit on Kerry

2004-10-27T23:43:00.000-07:00

Generally, I try not to inject myself in American partisan battles. This is not because I don't hold strong views, or sympathize strongly with many partisans, but that my own views tend blur or even erase traditional party lines. Without going too much into my own domestic policy beliefs -- since I try to keep this blog focused on international politics, which I feel are a national interest (read: apartisan, to invent a word) issue -- I tend to be very, very pro-individual rights, while recognizing that government has powerful re-distributive powers to make our society better. On fiscal matters, I am for limited government, low taxes, limited regulation of business, and minimal government spending. But then, who's not these days? Put briefly, without confronting the hard questions, I don't believe the government can solve all of people's problems, I don't want the government involved in people's lives, but I also understand that in the short term the government generally takes care of the poor and the marginalized better than the "free market".

That said, on a personal level, I am also a tremendous admirer of John Kerry. I've watched him from afar for nearly twenty years. I've never understood why the Boston Globe seems to hate him (other than the fact that he's not a Kennedy but seems to really, really want to be one). And through the presidential campaign, I've watched a man who has done some truly remarkable, one-of-a-kind, John McCain-ian things in his life be caricatured by the media and punditry and many ordinary folk (with a big assist from the Bush-Cheney 04 campaign) as uncharismatic, boring, somehow unaccomplished or undistinguished in public life and overly ambitious (and, honestly, is there such a thing in politics?)

So, I welcome and invite readers to check out Rude Pundit's post today: "Here's the deal - what's been missing from the entire Kerry campaign is just how tough a motherfucker John Kerry really, actually is..."

At Least We're Not Turkmenistan...

2004-10-27T22:01:00.000-07:00

Say what you will about the creeping "Putinization" and authoritarianism of the United States,* just to remember what a really messed up place looks like, I give you this article, from the BBC today:

Turkmenistan has been celebrating its independence holiday with a huge
parade in honour of President Niyazov, also known as Turkmenbashi.
Mr Niyazov, who is president for life, watched as the military, Turkmen horsemen
and others paid tribute in the main square of the capital, Ashgabat.
The assembled crowd shouted: "Great leader, great leader".
There had clearly been months of preparation for Wednesday's parade.
In bright sunshine, the Turkmen army marched through the marble square, shouting "Turkmenbashi, Turkmenbashi", saluting at the balcony where the leader was just visible. Rows and rows of identical black horses came next, their hooves painted gold, and their riders in gold sashes and traditional white lambskin hats.
Behind them danced hundreds of school children around a huge model of
Turkmenbashi's book of sayings, the Rukhnama. The book is required reading in schools and now stands alongside the Koran in mosques.
The festivities are yet another expression symbolising the authority's regime, and the blurring between Turkmenistan the country and Turkmenbashi the man.

Turkmenistan is possibly the most warped place on the planet, and it's certainly the most warped place I've ever known. Literally everything is "Turkmenbashi X", from Turkmenbashi vodka (yep, they're Muslim, sort of) to Turkmenbashi Gas Refinery. All of the former Soviet republics in Central Asia tend towards strongmen. Some do a "better" job of it, like Niyazov and his Uzbek counterpart Islam Karimov. Others are more mild-mannered, but equally omnipresent, such as Kazakhstan's Nursultan Nazarbaev. Others have already failed, but keep trying nonetheless, such as Kyrgyzstan's Askar Akaev and Tajikistan Emomali Rakhmonov.

The jury is still out on the one non-Soviet Central Asian leader -- Afghanistan's Hamid Karzai. My theory is that the political elite in Afghanistan is already too fractured from years of Soviet occupation, civil war and the Taliban to form the cohesive support network that all proper authoritarians need. In Central Asia, the many of the old Communist Party bigwigs have filled that role, and gradually been supplanted by a younger generation of post-Soviet nomenklatura.

*Note: not to be construed as a dismissal of Matt Yglesias' "Putinization" argument. I merely needed a lead in to the Turkmenistan piece, and I'm too tired to be more creative.

This Is Bad

2004-10-25T23:35:00.000-07:00

There are many times when it is legitimate to argue that adhering blindly to international law needlessly handcuffs the US. This is not one of them.

The Bush administration's arguments are morally and politically bankrupt. First of all, this is not just any old international law they're casting aside. It's the Geneva Conventions, folks. It's designed to protect people. Our people as much as anyone else. We cast it aside, and we lose moral authority, we lose esteem in the eyes of the world, our soldiers potentially lose some protections should our example to shirk international law be followed by any future adversary. That's just the beginning, and it's not even getting into deeper philosophical reasons why this is such bad policy.

Simply put, taking prisoners out of Iraq -- territory we already control and operate a prison system in -- could not possibly do enough to bolster the war on terror to offset the cost in reputation to the United States.

Resource Allocation

2004-10-25T23:31:00.000-07:00

For all of my regular readers (All two of you. Hi mom and dad!), I'd like to note that the Tacitus Project has become largely my space to reflect on current affairs and international events; any law school related posts are tending to go over to a group blog I'm taking part in, Nuts and Boalts. Anyone interested in my -- or some other interesting folks' -- take on law school issues should check out that blog.

Elisabeth Bumiller: She's Hack-tacular!

2004-10-24T22:07:00.000-07:00

Just browsing the NY Times Week in Review section this morning, and I was reminded of what a bad reporter Elisabeth Bumiller is. Let's take a look at today's prize winner.

I won't blame Bumiller for this, but who was the headline editor that decided that an article about the Republicans post-election fallout would be "A Confident Opposition"? In traditional political speech, the "opposition" refers to the minority party, or the out-of-power party. The Republicans control the House, the Senate, the Presidency and they have a favorable Supreme Court. In exactly what way do they, at this point, constitute an "opposition"?

Moving on to Bumiller's own "analysis", a few observations: If the Repubs lose power, Bumiller posits (without sourcing these claims) a couple of consequences:

1) "For starters, Karl Rove, Mr. Bush's powerful political adviser, would no longer be called a boy genius, although party insiders insist there would be less blame of him and Mr. Bush than might be expected."

This may be true. Equally, it may not be true. I'd like to hear more about these "party insiders" (such as, their identities). Because, you see, when predicting if a party might fragment after elections, as they frequently do, it might be useful to know who is really doing the predicting (say, Karl Rove's poolboy as opposed to Susan Collins' poolboy).

2) "Assuming that the party hangs on to the Senate, Bill Frist, the majority leader, would emerge as one of the most important Republicans in the country. So would Senator John McCain of Arizona, Mr. Bush's onetime nemesis. Paul Wolfowitz, the neo-conservative who urged the president into war with Iraq, would not.

OK, this has to be the lamest political analysis to appear in the Times outside of a Maureen Dowd column. Bill Frist, majority leader of the Senate, might "emerge as one of the most important Republicans". Umm, Beth, he already is majority leader of the Senate. Either he's already one of the most important Repubs, by dint of that weighty office, or he's already pretty marginalized and just a figurehead. Myself, I think the latter. But either way, the notion of Frist "emerging" as anything is nonsensical.

And who amongst us (to paraphrase candidate Kerry) -- outside of Ms. Bumiller, our link to the White House -- didn't already think John McCain was one of the most important Repubs?

Finally, has anyone cared about Wolfowitz since about May 2003? Obviously the man is on the outs, whether Bush wins or loses.

All of this is followed by some good analysis courtesy of David Gergen. Thanks Liz. We could probably just have called Gergen ourselves. That guy'll talk to anyone.

And then, she runs with this great quotation from Bill Kristol:

Republicans agreed that Iraq would be the major post-election fight should
Mr. Bush lose, with the neo-conservatives who pushed for the invasion as prime
targets. "There will be firing squads and an attempted purge,'' said William
Kristol, the editor of the conservative magazine The Weekly Standard and a
longtime advocate of the war. "We'll fight back. It'll be fun.''

Bumiller doesn't even blink at the humor of the always entertaining Kristol. I mean, is any party-infighting more serious than an "attempted purge"? Kristol is clearly suggesting, lightheartedly, that foreign policy could really set off some infighting in the Republican Party. Bumiller doesn't even try to address Kristol's point, instead moving on to the one-issue man, Grover Norquist, who declares that any foreign policy debate won't divide the Republicans since they are the party of de-regulation and tax cutting. Wrong. Norquist is the party of de-regulation and tax-cutting. He just also happens to do a lot of fund-raising for the Republicans. The Republican Party is not and has never been a single -- or dual -- issue party, and for Bumiller to accept Norquist's line on its face shows her total disinterest in doing any thinking of her own in her articles.

I can't even bring myself to dissect the second half of Bumiller's BS. But let's just say, she continues to quote Grover Norquist, which is always a bad sign.

When, oh when, will the Times get a decent national politics press corps?

I'm baaa-aaack!

2004-10-21T18:05:00.000-07:00

After a long hiatus -- fall break and school commitments -- I return to the blogosphere...
to post a very short note urging readers to check out Daniel Gross' latest in Slate. Gross profiles a much-profiled man, NY Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, but he talks in more depth about why the NY Attorney General's Office is the source of so much regulatory activity than I've seen in most other Spitzer pieces. Those articles tend to focus on Spitzer's striving, ambitious personality. Without focusing too much on those ambitions, Gross suggests there are many deeper institutional reasons as to why the NY Attorney General's Office has played such a prominent role in business regulation over the past few years.

And the Award for Best Pundit Goes to...

2004-10-09T01:56:00.000-07:00

...Andrew Sullivan, who I think has been on point on all of his instant analysis of the d-bates so far.

Andrew has this to say about tonights encounter (posted at 1:32 am):

AN EDGE TO KERRY: Stylistically, Kerry seemed, well, calmer. When the
camera cut to him during Bush's walkarounds, he was generally serene and
respectful. His parries were cleaner than Bush's; his mind seemed more
complicated - but not to the point of complete paralysis. Far from it. The
contrast between a man who can make an argument and one who can simply assert
what he believes to be a truth was striking. If we have learned anything these
past three years, it is that conviction is not enough. Skepticism, openness to
other arguments, thinking outside the box or against a bubble mentality: all
these are useful in a war leader and Bush has none of them. In some ways, Kerry
seemed more experienced than Bush, which, of course, he is. All in all, I'd say
that Kerry had a minuscule edge in both the substantive and stylistic contest.
But the fact that Bush seemed alive and kicking as a candidate will help him
regain some initiative as well.

Michigan GOP gets its panties in a bunch...

2004-10-07T17:56:00.000-07:00

... Over Michael Moore's gag prize of new underwear to first-time voters who pledge to vote on stage during his rallies. The Michigan GOP even went so far as to ask a local prosecutor's office in the state to prosecute Moore for an election law violation (offering something of value in exchange for a promise to vote.) While I think vote-buying is a serious matter, this is a little silly. And fortunately, so did this blessed local prosecutor, who denied the GOP request with a letter that reads, in part:

"Although we are a small prosecutor's office, we are extremely busy prosecuting serious criminal activity, ...I choose to devote our resources to prosecuting those who are delivering cocaine to our young people rather than underwear."

Let's all try to get Isabella Cty. Prosecutor Larry Burdick on a higher-profile stage: any man who can inject both sanity AND humor into our political process with such concision deserves our accolades!

War on Terror, Expanded

2004-10-06T23:29:00.000-07:00

Glenn Kessler has an OK "analysis" piece in today's Washington Post over the unraveling of the Bush Administration's rationales for war in Iraq. I say OK mainly because anyone who was paying attention saw that most of the rationales were flimsy or bogus to begin with.Here's Susan Rice, once of Kerry's foreign policy advisors, addressing the latest CIA report about Iraq's lack of WMD:

Rice argued that there is a different lesson from the report -- that the
sanctions had prevented Hussein from acquiring weapons and had greatly weakened
him. The United States, as a permanent member of the Security Council, could
forever veto any attempt to lift the sanctions, she said.
"What this means
is that the sanctions had him in a box, and he couldn't have gotten out of the
box unless the administration lifted him out of it," she said.

Kerry and Edwards, Kerry in particular, have done a good job of late distinguishing the war in Iraq from the war on terror. This looks like it will be phase II of the Kerry assault: framing the war on Iraq as unnecessary.

I actually think this is the tougher sell to the American people. Folks generally understand that Saddam wasn't a direct threat to the US and that he may not have had WMD. But he was also -- and everyone is in agreement here -- a pretty bad guy. Whether or not our motives were pure, what matters to most Americans is that we can say: by removing Saddam, we did some good in the world. The Bush campaign is pushing this theme hard: removing Saddam was the "right thing to do". Of course, the United States so infrequently does "the right thing" in foreign affairs, the politically jaded among us (myself included) are inclined to dismiss that argument as hogwash. But I think it resonates better with many voters than we give it credit for. 9/11 set off an upswing of a great deal of messianic feeling in this country, and I think the public support for the "fighting for freedom" foreign policy under Bush is both a reflection of that sentiment and something that the Kerry campaign will find very difficult to undermine.

Debate Insta-blogging

2004-10-05T19:03:00.000-07:00

Check out the play-by-play of the VP debate Tuesday night over at the very witty and astute site, The Poor Man. Best line, on Cheney's comparison of the situation in Afghanistan to the situation in El Salvador 20 years ago:

"Cheney Compares to El Salvador. Dear Lord, help me. Afghanistan will become like El Salvador, which is awesome."

From the Foreign Desk

2004-10-04T23:05:00.000-07:00

A friend of mine, working on elections in Iraq, waxes lyrically:

In a tiny Green Zone office, cooled by a gracious little fan, with the
thunder of Blackhawks and Apaches roaring distractingly overhead, I sat across a
diminuitive desk from the U.N.s chief electoral envoy this evening and shared a
few meaningful, wordless exchanges of eye-to-eye pauses between statements about the x, y and z of technical preparations that belied a surprising, yet
comforting, unity of message: "Holy fucking shit." A South American,
sporting a black, silk shirt with a Nehru-collar, who had organized East Timors
first, post-conflict elections, he undoubtedly had a better idea of how insanely
complex things might become. Comforting it was only in the fatalistic
assumption that we are going to do this. That barrier crossed, the only
question that remained: how?

Fortunately, my trusted correspondent seems to be asking some of the right follow-up questions:

What if the Sunnis boycott? The Kurds stuff the ballot box? Or the Shi'a,
by their disproportionate plurality, usher in an extension of the Islamic
Republic of Iran?

Unfortunately, because it is not in his proxy (he's not a security guy, he's a democracy promotion guy), my friend is ill-equipped to address (or even, in his letter to me, even own up to) to the greatest danger to Iraqi elections: the chaos and fighting that would keep masses of people away from voting, or that any elected government would lack the means and authority to protect and sustain itself. I respect my friend and his work, but I seriously hope he doesn't think that Kurd ballot stuffing is the greatest danger to the Iraqi elections.

Blame the Chechens

2004-09-28T18:26:00.000-07:00

From Peter Finn at the Washington Post comes this report that Russian investigators have arrested two Chechens for involvement in the shooting of American-born Forbes editor Paul Klebnikov in Moscow in July. The article unfortunately dives immediately into much (and quite convoluted) speculation as to why some Chechen group might want to kill Klebnikov. (And the logic is quite convoluted: Klebnikov writes in his book "Conversations with a Barbarian" about how the Chechen Islamist movement has become entangled -- to the point of being synonymous -- with organized crime. Out of anger about that characterization, the Chechens order a mob-style hit on him? As an explanation, I find it unconvincing, but you all can draw your own conclusions.)

I can't help but think that a little more reserve might have been in order, on the Post's part. I mean, all we have right now is the Russian government's word that these two men are in some way resolved. And we've seen quite recently that the Russian government's word isn't necessarily that trustworthy. In a major American newspaper, I would have rather seen some more inquiry into other possible lines of investigation. Blaming the Chechens seems a little too convenient.

Now, there are a lot of nasty Chechens, it's true. And it is within the realm of possibility that they were responsible for Klebnikov's killing. But for two months this appeared to be a cold case -- we heard nothing about it. Then a stream of Chechnya-related terrorism. And suddenly, we've got two Chechens who killed an American editor. That's pretty convenient for the Russian government, in terms of pulling in American support for whatever plans they have in Chechnya...

Those Enterprising Stanford Students...

2004-09-24T23:55:00.000-07:00

This Oakland Tribune story has it all: sex, secret bank accounts, a criminal investigation, sex for money, a Stanford law grad, tax evasion (did I mention sex?)...

Money quote, from the Special Agent who helped lead the investigation:

"Based on my training and experience, generally people whose adjusted gross income is consistently less than $13,500 a year are not able to put themselves through Stanford Law School, lease a $70,000 Mercedes-Benz for $1,486 a month, live alone in a $1,800-a-month apartment, pay off almost $300,000 in loans, compile savings over $10,000, build a cash hoard of $40,000, throw away $2,400 in cash and buy postal money orders totaling $13,500 all at one time."

I don't even have a witty line to end this post with. Just keep an eye on your law school classmates, I guess. You never know what shenanigans they might be up to. And remember: it's always the quiet ones. Or the ones driving the $70,000 cars.

(Caveat lector: originally posted on a blog I've recently been invited to take part in, Nuts and Boalts).

An open invitation to Jon Stewart

2004-09-24T23:27:00.000-07:00

Jon Stewart, in Time last week:

TIME: WRITING A BOOK IS SO RETRO. SHOULDN'T YOU BE BLOGGING OR SOMETHING?

JS: I can't. It's too hip. Then I'd have to get a BlackBerry, and I'm wired in, and next thing you know, I'm at a Black-Eyed Peas concert with a crack problem. I just can't go down that road.

Jon, I'll buy you a BlackBerry and the Black-Eyed Peas tix. Please! If you need a forum, we've got a couple of open guest blogging spots here at the Project.

Get back to me, Jon. I'll be waiting.

Che

2004-09-24T21:10:00.000-07:00

So I love motorcycles, I love roadtrips and I love road books and movies (think "On the Road", "Lolita", "An Area of Darkness," etc.). So logically, I'd probably like "The Motorcycle Diaries", the new Che Guevara biopic about his youthful motorcycle trip across South America.

But I've always been a little wary of the American college student embrace of Che Guevara. I understand that people are drawn to revolutionaries, particularly those who die young. As a student of Russian history, however, I know how many followers Lenin and Stalin had in the United States, even long after we understood the regime they created was totalitarian and inhumane. As inspiring a figure as he might have been, and as attractive his rhetoric might have been, Che's main accomplishment in life (as opposed to his seductive words) was to help create a regime that rivals the Soviet Union for inhumanity.

So I don't think I'll probably see "The Motorcycle Diaries". But I hear the audience at Sundance loved it. Read the link. It's an excellent article by Paul Berman on the Che phenomenon.

Which one of these things is not like the other?

2004-09-24T14:38:00.000-07:00

Kevin Drum over at the Washington Monthly has an interesting little pointer to a 2001 State Department web-page on areas where Al Qaeda (our biggest, baddest hostile terrorist network) was known to be active.

There is a great graphic on the State Dept. page that I am unable to transpose to this blog, so I urge you to check it out yourselves. Look for the conspicuous light colored (i.e. non-al Qaeda territory) in the middle of the map (the Middle East, coincidentally).

And just in case you need more help, your State Department provides a handy list of countries where al Qaea is active. See if you can spot the conspicuous absence now (I'll even give you a hint: look around the I's):

Albania, Algeria, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium Bosnia, Egypt, Eritrea, France, Germany, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Kosovo, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Russia
Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom,United States, Uzbekistan, Yemen

Perhaps we should invade France? It is, after all, a country which has opposed US foreign policy around the globe, which according to the State Dept. has ties to al Qaeda and which has a history of pursuing weapons of mass destruction, even over global outcry. Those French must be stopped!

UN, Shmu-N

2004-09-22T22:03:00.000-07:00

Great piece by Yonatan Lupu in the New Republic today.

Lupu is right: the UN truly finds itself at a crossroads: it is at once a global power broker and yet powerless. If it overplays its hand in terms of influence, it will expose it to questions about its status as a power broker. Annan should trudge carefully into the area of international law, lest he expose his organization's soft underbelly: the fact that international law has always been treated basically as an "opt-out" system. If truly powerful nations such as the US start opting out, the UN loses even more of its powerbroker cache.

Cat Stevens, international terrorist?

2004-09-21T20:00:00.000-07:00

Via Drudge, we learn in this AP piece that the man who gave the world "Morning Has Broken" in the 70s is now on a US government terrorist watch list... The former Cat Stevens has changes his name to Yusuf Islam and converted to Islam. And he is active in the Islamic community, having started a Muslim school in London, among other things.

But the US government actually spent resources to divert a plane he was on (London-DC) to make sure that this very dangerous individual didn't enter the US? Perhaps I shouldn't be so snarky about all this, but the man started a charity "Small Kindness" which cares for 2400 orphans in Kosovo, and he donates all revenues from the rights to his hits to charities. Now perhaps some of those charities have "links" to terrorist groups -- I don't know,but in the shadowy world of terrorist funding, imagine it's possible. Is that, however, any reason to deny Mr. Islam the privilege of entering the United States? Merely because -- probably unwittingly -- some charities he supports might support terrorists?

Update: this Scotsman article seems to confirm most of my speculation, and confirms that we're talking about the same Yusuf Islam/Cat Stevens. This is a pretty shameful day for a free country.

This is all speculation on my part. The AP story raises more questions than it answers, such as: Is this Yusuf Islam really the former Cat Stevens? Why is he on a US government watch list (is it a more serious reason than connections to terrorist financing, which is just my best guess)? But I'd really like to see some media follow-up on this one!

Long Hiatus

2004-09-20T23:37:00.000-07:00

I took about ten days off from blogging to get settled into the law school routine. The good news: it's definitely a routine. The bad news: I'm still not settled.

The herd mentality of law students is quite astonishing, and quite captivating even to self-styled iconoclasts such as myself. Much of the pressure of the place seems to derive not from the workload itself, but from fellow students' feelings towards and treatment of that workload. I am doing all of my academic obligations, plus I have quite a bit of time on the side for socializing, and my biggest worry is: what are all these other people doing that keeps them so busy?

At the same time, my fellow students remain the best thing and most pleasant surprise about law school; there are so many inspiring stories, so many diverse interests and experiences represented, and so many different goals and visions for life. I hope that doesn't change too much as we go through, and the seemingly inevitable tractor beam of bigfirm life begins to set in.

It has been a rather up-and-down ten days for me. One day, I feel in full command of the material; the next, I can scarcely follow the professor, let alone recall what we discussed yesterday. As I alluded to earlier, not knowing if I am approaching this whole experience right, and knowing what a central role first-year plays in your whole legal career, this is the paradox I am wrestling with these days...

Headlines that matter...

2004-09-10T01:39:00.000-07:00

...Only to NY Times headlines editors and .001 percent of the American population:

Campaigns Enlist Big Names to Set Debates' Details

Masha Lipman WashPost Editorial

2004-09-09T13:56:00.000-07:00

Masha Lipman has this sublime, frustrated, passionate op-ed today in the Washington Post. It is stunning that the two leading Russian reporters on the Caucusus were "incapacitated" over the few days of what is likely the single most important event in the North Caucusus of the past decade. Babitsky was arrested (again). Politkovskaya was poisoned? That sounds odd, but possible. The firing of the Izvestia editor is shameful. The absence of federal officials stepping up to assume responsibility, during the siege and after, is shameful. And the apparent foreclosure of the idea of an open inquiry into the tragedy, again, is shameful.

By contrast, I don't buy Richard Pipes' argument that "all"Russia needs to do is give up Chechnya. That would look like total capitulation, the kind of thing which Pipes and the conservative camp have decried as namby-pamby liberal appeasement since 9/11. Pipes suggests Russia follow the example of the French with Algeria. Well, that's a fine idea, except Algeria doesn't lie geographically inside of France, where it can seriously geopolitically destabilize a whole sensitive region.

And this statement just made me chuckle: "After the school siege, there was much muttering in the streets that under Stalin such atrocities would not have occurred." Umm. I know a lot of younger generation Russians. They just don't do the constant Stalin references, and the several I communicated with last week certainly didn't bring up the Soviet past. Only _really_ old people still do the Stalin references. Perhaps that's about right for Pipes, who was tenured at Harvard in 1958 (making him certifiably old, by my standards, although still quite young and eligible by the standards of my grandma). And how is Pipes monitoring the mutterings in the Russian street these days anyway?

Welcome to The Grind

2004-09-08T23:09:00.000-07:00

You remember the Grind, the old dance show on MTV hosted by the unforgettable Eric Nies, star of the first Real World?

This post is not about that show. It's about law school.

Now that I think about it, law school may in fact be like the Grind. Both share lots of superficially interesting but ultimately cutthroat and attention-starved people. On the Grind, these folks mug for the camera. In law school, they try to show off for the Professor. There are the "couples" they love to feature on the Grind, and there are the instant couples that seem to form in LS. On the grind, they have a Green Room with snacks and drinks. At law school we have afternoon parties with chips and beer in the quad between classes. My professor even kicked off class this afternoon with a cheery "Let's Get this Party Started."

More seriously, though, it seems like one of the major obstacles of first-year law school is simply getting used to the ins-and-outs of daily classes, readings and so on. Taken independently, none of the work is terribly onerous, but the combination of classes, memo-writing assignments and social and extracurricular activities keeps me basically without any "down time". Tonight, I took time to hang out with my housemate and some friends. And unfortunately, I now realize it's going to seriously set me back for tomorrow. But I might as well learn how to balance my workload and my social calendar early on, n'est ce pas?

Good Washington Post story

2004-09-06T22:08:00.000-07:00

Peter Baker and Susan Glasser file this excellent piece in the Washington Post today on the terrorists involved in the Beslan hostage-taking. Particularly interesting is their tale of Magas, one of the four leaders of the rebel contingent of 32. Magas has been identified by Russian authorities as three different men, and killed three different times. Now they say he was a police officer who disappeared in 1998. Fascinating stuff, and a micro-level example of the confusion in the North Caucusus in general.

The World: A Safer Place?

2004-09-06T15:51:00.000-07:00

This might be a cheap shot, but I am going to take it.

The whole of Russia's North Caucasus are edging towards chaos, and no one in Moscow or elsewhere seems to have a coherent plant to stop the violence.

"Militias" in Sudan have been terrorizing the populace, despite two months of ineffectual promises by the Sudanese government to rein in the barbarians. And now, after all the supposed "deadlines" and inaction by the international community, thousands are still fleeing their homes in light of new clashes.

In Iraq, seven more brave Americans died defending a people that doesn't want us there, despite our conviction that we are bringing them freedom and opportunity. One sentence in the piece particularly caught my eye: "Meanwhile, a report says that the number of US soldiers injured in Iraq in August is the highest since the war began. About 1,100 soldiers and marines are thought to have been wounded last month."

In Gaza City, more loss of life in a seemingly intractable conflict...

In Afghanistan, worries about the chaos that "democracy" might wrought.

At least North Korea isn't threatening any one this week. Pyongyang's last tantrum was last week.

There exists, unfortunately, a vacuum of leadership on international issues, not just in the United States but around the world. And the world is paying the price. Around the world, leaders' priorities are fixed on short-term, national interest driven fixes to short-term, interest-driven problems.

Meanwhile, existential threats not just to individual nation-states, but to the whole world -- I'm talking about nuclear proliferation, certain environmental issues, the rise in extreme ethnic violence, poverty -- go unaddressed.

Sorry for the rather depressing posting, but I was just perusing the BBC News web-page, and the amount of depressing news shocked me...

More on Russian School Tragedy

2004-09-04T16:05:00.000-07:00

I want to expand on some of my earlier thoughts, as well as respond to some of the curious ideas I've seen floating around the blogosphere/media...

First, I remain reluctant to criticize the Russian government's handling of this particular attack. In fact, it seems at first glance that the Russian troops around the Beslan school showed unusual restraint, at least until after the two explosions and the militants in the school opened fire. I've seen no evidence, and more importantly I've heard no Russian claims, that they somehow opened the salvo by sending in a special ops team to detonate something in or around the gym.

In general, however, I agree with the sentiments expressed by one of the Beslan relatives quoted in this NY Times piece. "'Where was he earlier?' asked one man in Beslan, Valery Dzatiyev, as he continued his increasingly desperate search for his 8-year-old brother, who was among the more than 200 hostages unaccounted for after the chaotic end to the siege."

Putin has simply disappeared for stretches after many of the major crises of his presidency, from the Kursk to the Moscow theater hostage taking... And now this. His hesitation to address the nation, if not to declare Russia "at war" (as he did today) then simply to show his people that he understands and shares in their anguish, represents a major failure of leadership. I understand the psychology of the Putin administration -- any expression of grief would seem to them as a show of weakness. However the Russian people need to know that their elected president is not so disconnected that he doesn't understand their suffering; such disconnect was the hallmark of the Soviet era (the era in which Vladimir Putin learned his lessons), but it's not suitable to a democracy.

Right-leaning commentators and blogs have seized on Russian officials' declarations that there were some 10 "Arabs" among the hostage-takers, usually to conflate the terrorist threat facing Russia with the one facing the United States. First off, I am reluctant to make too much of these claims absent some hard evidence. After all, this is the same class of officials who told us: 1) the Kursk sank because it collided with an American submarine (and numerous other fabricated excuses after that; 2) there were "354" hostages in the Beslan school on Wednesday. (It now appears there were well over 1,000. Russian officials' version of the truth is usually the one that best supports whatever public relations argument they are making at that moment.

Along similar lines, I would not be leaping at the opportunity to conflate the terrorist threat America faces with the threat facing Russia. If anything, Russia's terrorist threat bears stronger resemblance to that of Israel: an existential threat, to be sure, more serious than our own, but also more tightly correlated with a failed and immoral policy. Russian actions in Chechnya have been brutal and horrific, and they've contributed much to the animosity Chechens feel towards Russia. A change in policy, or at least the appearance of a peaceful political process, over time would make Russia significantly less vulnerable to the Chechen/North Caucasian threat. The United States really has no such options in dealing with al Qaeda (this was particularly true pre-Iraq war). Moreover, while a threat, al Qaeda does not represent the kind of existential threat to the US that the Chechen-led Islamist movement represents to Russia. The Chechen movement seeks to tear a hole of territory right from the middle of the Russian Federation. Al Qaeda seeks to get the US disengaged in the Islamic world, but if anything it represents a more existential threat to the Saudi royal family, who it would prefer to depose.

Putin is in a really tight spot now. He declared Russia in a "total and full-scale war" today, but he's got no good cards left to play. Russia has invaded Chechnya twice in the past ten years, both with rather disastrous results. A Russian-backed leader governs Chechnya today. But Russia is still unable to put down the separatists, or even to prevent them from coming into Russia. Which highlights a larger problem. Whether or not there were "Arabs" on the hostage-taking crew, there were definitely North Ossetians. Just like earlier this year, there were a bunch of Ingushetians who attacked a Russian police post there. Russia faces a disaffected and deadly threat not only from the Chechens, who have borne the brunt of Moscow's retribution, but also from co-religionists and ethnic minorities throughout the North Caucuses. Russia needs to develop a better way to bring these people back into peaceful political and social discourse. But Putin's autocratic governing style, and the Russian regional governing style in general, is not conducive to inclusion, but rather remains a rigid top-down system that has existed since Czarist times. How will it adapt? This will be the true test of Putin's leadership.

Russia Attack, Part II

2004-09-03T13:37:00.000-07:00

I want to comment at length on the horrific end to the mass kidnapping at the school in Beslan in southern Russia, but unfortunately I have to run to class in fifteen minutes.

Still, a few thoughts that I will expand on in a later post.

I have in the past been critical of the way the Russian government has handled Chechnya, terrorism and other calamities (the Kursk tragedy, etc.). I may eventually be critical of the Putin administration's handling of this crisis (like the fact that he still hadn't commented on the drama of the day, the night that it unfolded (the shoot out began around 1 p.m. -- as of 9 p.m. Moscow time there was not a peep from the Kremlin)). At this point, I don't have enough information on what the Kremlin response was/is -- Putin could have good reasons for not commenting immediately.

Right now, I think we in the United States need to recognize the magnitude of what has happened in Russia over the past two weeks. After the plane bombings, Moscow papers took to calling it "Russia's September 11", which as an American I resented a bit (since the magnitude of those tragedies was so different). But I believe the Beslan siege and its tragic, bloody end is Russia's September 11. The Russian people will not soon recover from the horror of today. I hope that Americans take a step back from our ugly presidential campaign to mourn for the loss of these innocents and Russia's innocence.

Today I am reminded of nothing more than Dostoevsky's famous passage, in the Brother's Karamazov, about the suffering of children. A link to one translation of that chapter is here.

More to come.

Russia attack

2004-08-31T23:48:00.000-07:00

Another day, another terrorist attack in Russia. Vladimir Putin is living proof that a president can do all the things possible to make the citizenry less safe, less secure, and still retain the image of a strong leader. And Putin has the approval ratings to back it up. GW Bush should take notes.

Week 2 – the dew is off the lily

2004-08-31T23:40:00.000-07:00

My mood has sunk in week 2 of law school. So far I’ve had few problems staying on top of the reading. But the feeling of more work than time is growing, and with it the accompanying feeling of anxiety.

The feeling of anxiety is coupled with a loss of excitement, both on the academic and personal fronts. I’ve made friends, but it’s too early to say that these will be lasting friendships. I can see the outlines of a routine setting in. But is it a routine that I will enjoy, that I will find fulfilling?

Obviously, I’ve got particular incidents, particular people in mind here, and I am reluctant to go into much detail, even in an anonymous blog. That’s not only out of respect for their right not to be the unwitting subject of on-line discussion, but also because posts such as this serve as a sort of “blog therapy” – instant emotional reactions and processing; I could – and likely will – look back on these musings with some regret and hopefully humor down the line, and I would not like to think that I made a spur-of-the-moment assessment of someone I barely know that proves (over the course of time) to be patently unfair or unjustified.

A case in point: already, with Prof. Crim, I've run the gambit of reactions. I have come to the conclusion that he's a nice man, not a great public speaker but a great thinker, and that he makes up for his lack of verbal communication skills in lecture by being extremely open to other forms of student interaction. But before I arrived at that conclusion, I went from being indifferent to actively disliking to liking to being indifferent to the class, all in just five class periods. And I am still not convinced of the correctness of my conclusion. He might be an excellent communicator, and I just a poor listener in the law school classroom context...

All of this is a very roundabout way of saying, I wish I had more to share with my readers about how I am perceiving my first few weeks of school. But I am reluctant to come to any rash judgments about the experience myself. Eventually I hope to be able to express more clearly my thoughts and feelings with you all.

More press-watching... umm, hounding.

2004-08-30T22:33:00.000-07:00

Brad DeLong is already on his case, but today's David Broder piece -- here -- deserves mention. John McCain is a great man and everything, but does Broder need to devote a whole column -- in the middle of an election in which McCain is not (yet) a participant -- to giving the journalistic equivalent of a blowjob. Doesn't the "Dean of the Washington Press Corps" have a better piece to run?

David Brooks Intellectual Honesty Watch

2004-08-30T21:38:00.000-07:00

So David Brooks is back today with an op-ed trying to craft a common thread between McCain, Guiliani, Schwarzenegger and Bush. Curiously, he chooses courage. Now McCain clearly has shown courage in his lifetime. Guiliani, I would say, showed great leadership aroudn 9/11, but I would not say he has shown incredible courage. Schwazenegger? I don't know. He was Conan the Barbarian, I guess.

What McCain, Schwarzenegger and Guiliani do share, however, is immense popularity, particularly among indepedents and moderates. That's the common thread -- lifeline? -- Bush (he of the sub 50% approval ratings) is trying to grab onto.

But here's where Brooks' intellectual honesty really comes into play:

"If Sept. 11 had not happened, I doubt McCain, Giuliani and Schwarzenegger would be as intertwined with George Bush as they have been. But it did happen. And whatever their cultural and personal differences, they do see eye to eye on the global conflict with radical Islam."

Brooks is clearly suggesting there has been some sort of long-term (post-Sept. 11 to the present) "intertwining" of Bush and the three popular gentlemen. That is of course a distortion of reality, to put it mildly. McCain has embraced Bush more in the election year, but he has hardly been the president's right-hand man since 2001. Giuliani has been pretty much off the political scene since retiring as mayor. And Schwazenegger didn't even appear on the political scene until 2003.

It's one thing for Brooks to assert the four share a character trait -- courage -- though I disagree with him there. It's quite another to suggest the four have been "intertwined" over the past three years -- that's totally misleading.

But here's Brooks' top bit of hackery in the piece-- the conclusion:

"The coming weeks will be so tough because the essential contest - of which the Swift boat stuff was only a start - will be over who really has courage, who really has resolve, and who is just a fraud with a manly bearing."

David Brooks -- a fraud with a journalistic bearing.

Terrorism in Russia?

2004-08-27T15:02:00.000-07:00

Now Russian investigators say they have found traces of explosives on debris from the two planes that crashed earlier this week.

A few thoughts: the parallels between this latest tragedy and the sinking of the Kursk submarine -- one of the lowest points of the Putin presidency -- are rather amazing.

First, the Transport Ministry in this case denied terrorism as a likely cause of the crashes, as the authorities similarly issued later-to-be-retracted denials almost daily (on a variety of issues) in the Kursk incident. This tendency to issue statements that they likely know to be unfounded or poorly grounded in fact is disturbing, insofar as it shows a government that is willing to essentially lie to its people (whatever the motive -- to quell outrage, etc.).

Second, and perhaps more interesting, is the disappearance of Vladimir Putin from the stage during times of national tragedy. Bush has been criticized for disappearing for a few hours during the chaos of September 11 (which is understandable, if not excusable, given the terrors of the day). But in the days that followed, the president took concious steps to address the nation, help with its grief and show his strength as commander-in-chief. Putin, by contrast, in the most trying moments of his presidency, has kept totally out of the public eye. He was roundly criticized for not cutting off his vacation to deal with the Kursk incident. And now, the Times reports, "President Vladimir V. Putin, for a second day, did not address the crashes publicly, leaving statements about the circumstances surrounding to security and transportation officials."

Show a little leadership, Vova.

Law School, Week 1

2004-08-27T02:17:00.000-07:00

There is an old maxim, it seems, that says that law school is like high school. Judging by the first week, the adage is essentially true.

A caveat: unlike high school, people are older and generally more accepting of others. Everyone in my 1L class strikes me as fundamentally committed to friendly relations with their peers. There is none of the exclusion associated with high school cliques.

And yet... there are certainly cliques. And there are crushes (my friends have taken to calling their interests their "1L crushes" -- meaning they occurred in the first year, not that all the crushes are first years). The 1L crush is that person you pass in the hall or see in class who brightens your day. It's a positive, affirming relationship (most of my friends seem to have spoken to, often in depth, their crush). I actually endorse the idea of the 1L crush, on the idea that law school isn't necessarily all that fun all the time, so whatever improves your quality of life in some way is a net positive...

All in all, it's been an amazing first week. I'm really happy about the people I've met, some of whom I really expect to be close friends for this whole experience. And even those with whom I haven't had an immediate connection, I am impressed with their diversity of experiences and perspectives. Coming from East Coast to West, there is a genuine cultural difference that I am still absorbing. But I like the pace and approach to life out here. It's been a stimulating, inspiring week -- everything that I could have asked for academically (I really enjoy my classes), and better than I ever would have expected socially.

Mixed Messages

2004-08-24T00:20:00.000-07:00

The Washington Post editorial page is a little all over the map today. One of the lead editorials calls for an end to the "Swift Boat Sniping". The editorial struggles a little too much to be "balanced", insofar as "sniping suggests both sides are responsible for the exchange, while I think the Swift Boat fight has been more "attack-rebut" in nature. Moreover, it is the media that has perpetuated the Swift Boat line of attack for the past two weeks. And the Post continues to do so. These are essentially baseless claims, though the Post professes to remain "troubled" by Kerry's Christmas in Cambodia claims. This standard for political candor is admirable, but a bit disingenuous. After all, whether or not Kerry has been totally upfront about his Christmas in 1968 (and it does seem, at least, that he was near if not in Cambodia at that time), his alleged "lack of candor" pales in comparison with the Bush administration's selling of the Iraq war, or the tax cut, which involve a lack of candor that directly relates to policy and the American people. Still, later on the page, the Post runs a very partisan piece on the Christmas in Cambodia story by AEI fellow Josh Muravchik, and David Ignatius chimes in with a pretty reasonable take on why this whole Swift Boat line of attack could backfire on Bush. So much for the Post's deeply-felt yearning for a substantive policy debate on the candidate's course for the nation over the next four years... Let's just keep talking about Vietnam, shall we?

Oh yes, we shall, because E.J. Dionne wants to talk about the Swifties today, too. So does David Broder.

"The sooner the campaign debate shifts from Swift boats toward substance, the better off voters will be," the Post wrote in its lead editorial. So editors, how about heeding your own advice, exercising your influence as a major, national agenda-setting newspaper and turning away from the Swift Boat smear for a while?

Update: The Post editors should read this Fred Kaplan piece in Slate, which slices and dices the Christmas in Cambodia smear enough to put their "troubles" to rest.

Jeremy Blachman!

2004-08-23T00:39:00.000-07:00

Jeremy Blachman, whose blog has been great of late, has a very timely post of advice for incoming 1Ls.

random outrages

2004-08-23T00:02:00.000-07:00

I was watching the Olympics coverage on NBC, and it suddenly struck me as a bit deceptive. By the time I watched it, at 11 pm Pacific, the results of the 100 meter final had been known for hours. And yet NBC cut out of the men's pommel horse final to Bob Costas in the studio, and Costas began describing the men's final as though it had not yet happened, as though it were a live broadcast. I understand Costas and NBC don't want to spoil the suspense, perhaps by saying something like, "Now let's go watch Justin Gatlin win the men's 100-meter sprint." But to broadcast the segment instead as if it were somehow live coverage strikes me as deceptive, if only in a small way.

Misleading in a different way was Marine Major Glen Butler's op-ed in the New York Times today.

Butler begins showing his colors early on with a little dig at the media:

"At first there were no news media in Najaf; now, I assume, it's getting crowded, although the authorities have restricted access after a group of journalists "embedded" with the Mahdi Militia muddied the problem and jeopardized others' safety. I haven't had time to catch much CNN or Fox News, and although I've seen a few headlines forwarded to me by friends, I don't think the world is seeing the complete picture."

Interesting. "Embedding" was lauded by the Pentagon early in the war, when journos were attached to US military formations. Now that some media have escaped the Pentagon's watchful eye, "embedded" is a term of derision. But more laughable is the notion that a soldier, who should be focused on fulfilling a specific mission in "his little corner of Mesopotamia", can provide a "complete picture". This is like having a player from one team cover the World Series for his hometown paper. An interesting perspective, to be sure. But far from a complete picture. I suppose Butler hasn't claimed that he will provide a complete picture, so I should lay off him on this one.

Butler then makes the following claim: "The forces we're fighting around Iraq are a conglomeration of renegade Shiites, former Baathists, Iranians, Syrians, terrorists with ties to Ansar al-Islam and Al Qaeda, petty criminals, destitute citizens looking for excitement or money, and yes, even a few frustrated Iraqis who worry about Wal-Mart culture infringing on their neighborhood." I have no idea how a helicopter pilot is in any position to know that the people he's firing on on the ground have ties to Ansar al-Islam and al Qaeda, but apparently he does. Seriously folks, there are a lot of different groups resisting the US forces and the new Iraqi government, but the analysis I've seen concludes there aren't many foreign fighters and it's impossible to say how many have ties to Ansar or al Qaeda.

But then Butler goes totally off the deep end.

"The pre-emptive doctrine of the current administration will continue to be debated long after I'm gone, but one fact stands for itself: America has not been hit with another catastrophic attack since 9/11. I firmly believe that our actions in Afghanistan and Iraq are major reasons that we've had it so good at home. Building a "fortress America" is not only impractical, it's impossible. Prudent homeland security measures are vital, to be sure, but attacking the source of the threat remains essential. "

Butler's argument simply does not follow logically. America has not suffered a terrorist attack since 9/11, ergo pre-emptive strategy makes America safer? First of all, Butler conflates Iraq and Afghanistan. But Afghanistan was not a pre-emptive attack. It was a retaliatory response to 9/11. Second, though there have been no terrorist attacks in the US since 9/11, there was the 3/11 attack in Madrid, the Bali bombings in Indonesia, the numerous attacks on Americans and foreigners in Saudi Arabia... Americans abroad certainly don't feel safer as a result of the Bush administration's pre-emptive doctrine.

Finally, Butler gets to this (after a maddening harangue against the "false patriotism" of those who support our military men and women but who disagree with the Iraq war):

"Michael Moore recently asked Bill O'Reilly if he would sacrifice his son for Falluja. A clever rhetorical device, but it's the wrong question: this war is about Des Moines, not Falluja. This country is breeding and attracting militants who are all eager to grab box cutters, dirty bombs, suicide vests or biological weapons, and then come fight us in Chicago, Santa Monica or Long Island. "

Butler gets the chicken-egg thing reversed here. _Now_ Iraq is in danger of becoming a haven for radical Islamists. But this is at least in part _because_ of the chaos caused by the US invasion. No Iraqis were grabbing box cutters on 9/11, or had anything to do with dirty bombs before the 2003 war. Most Iraqis were simply not the crew of Muslims eager to harm the US before we invaded them. If they do want to now, that's a result of this war, but it was not a justification for it in 2003.

I agree with Butler that we can't cut and run in Iraq. The stakes are too high. But he's still wrong: the invasion of Iraq has not been in the interests of US national security. It has diverted tremendous resources away from the real theaters of the war on terror (namely, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, etc.), it has fueled more anti-American feeling in the Muslim world, and the post-war chaos threatens to destabilize the entire Middle East.

Wow

2004-08-22T11:33:00.000-07:00

Somebody stole Munch's "The Scream". Right off the wall of the Munch Museum in Oslo.

News Flash!!!

2004-08-22T10:59:00.000-07:00

Hey, in case any of you missed it, the New York Times this week has come to a momentous, and timely conclusion: going negative in a political campaign works! Someone tell Mike Dukakis. Seriously, though, is this breaking news, even in a Week in Review section?

And on the front page (of their web edition, in any case), the Times run a story entitled "Group Running Anti-Kerry Ads Denies Ties To Republican Party". I agree with Kevin Drum here, the media has mistaken (or forsaken) its responsibility not to report all news as though it is equally factual, but to help readers discern the wheat from the chaff, objective realities from complex events. In this case, it is clear from the content of the ads as well as the pre-existing relationships between the Swifties financial backers and the Republican party that the group can deny "ties" as much as they want, but said denials do not present an full and accurate picture of reality (much as people can assert "ties" between Iraq and al Qaeda). The bulk of the story is more accurate than the headline, but it still treats recent allegations from men who have increasing credibility problems and ever-changing stories as though they are as valid as a thirty-plus year old documentary record.

It's time for more media-energy be expended reporting this story for what it is in the present reality of a presidential campaign -- a pure and ugly political smear campaign -- rather than what it is not: a genuine historical re-examination of John Kerry's Vietnam record.

Update: The Boston Globe has a good editorial on the Swift Boat matter here.

Mr. 1L, tear down that wall!

2004-08-21T09:46:00.000-07:00

The Reagan reference is my best stab at irrelevant humor this morning. I've now had two "grueling" (read: boring, but busy) days of orientation. I've met countless people, forgotten most of their names, and had so many impressions that I came home both days at 6 just wanting to nap (a habit I left behind in the freshman year of college -- that is to say, almost 10 years ago).

One of the most striking developments of day 2, on the social side of orientation, was that a palpable, even visible, divide has begun forming between people just out of college (or one year removed) and people several years out (as is my case). I think it's too bad: we have much to benefit from each other. As an somewhat older student (and I'm only in my late 20s here), I love the exuberance and youthful optimism that the really recent grads bring. I'm sure many of them will own me in the classroom. And we somewhat older students have some real-world experience to bring that could really enhance the experience for the younger crowd.

But on the social leve, as I was saying, a divide is clearly forming, and I think that would be a shame if it persists. I think the social divide stems from a crisis of confidence on both sides. Some of the younger students hear the experiences of the older folk and say "wow, I haven't really done anything" and they get visibly uncomfortable and don't know where to go from there. Meanwhile, I suspect many of the older students, like me, don't know what to ask these kids about beyond "where'd you go to school? what did you study?" University socializes people in one way -- easy access to friends, ready-made conversations (about class, other friends), shared experiences. In the "real world", I think you need to work harder (or differently) in social situations, since you don't have as many shared experiences with many of your friends (you work in different jobs and offices, have expanding circles of friends that may not know each other, etc.).

I hope that as the year goes on these social barriers, real or imagined, will break down a bit.

1L Orientation

2004-08-19T19:03:00.000-07:00

Had my first day of orientation at law school today. Impressions were definitely mixed. There was a collegiate atmosphere that dominated the class -- everyone (men and women) was dressed more or less for a frat party, not a professional event. However, everyone I met was also nice in a genuine way. They seemed like real people. I'll be interested to hear more of their stories as we all get to know each other better, as I'm sure many of them have fascinating stories to tell. Unfortunately, the first day of orientation doesn't seem conducive to that kind of conversation -- or at least most of the people whom I encountered didn't want to talk about themselves (or anyone else) beyond the facile "where did you graduate from? where are you living? how do you like the city?" level.

In the news, I was happy to see Kerry finally hit back hard against Bush on account of the Swift Boats attack. I think that's the right approach for Kerry. Don't attack the Swifties, they're just messengers. Attack the source, and make it Bush's problem that he won't denounce such ugliness.

Also, South African President Thabo Mbeki (who has already distinguished himself for his enlightened views on AIDS) wants to reform the UN to give developing nations a bigger say in international affairs.

"The transformation of the United Nations has taken far too long," he said. "The other multilateral institutions like the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank and International Monetary Fund) and the World Trade Organisation also need to be transformed to meet the needs of our people."

This is a great idea, like Communism was a great idea: in theory. (Though snarkiness aside, I'm unconvinced this is even a good idea in theory). There is general agreement among IR specialists that the world tends to be most stable when the number of power centers is reduced (hence the "bipolar" world of the Cold War was among the most stable IR systems in human history, the argument goes). I fear these theorists are rights: in international affairs, too many cooks does spoil the broth. Every country has its own interests and plays international politics to its own advantage. Giving more players a bigger seat at the table only makes the situation more chaotic, and broadens the field for potential conflicts. Practically speaking, Mbeki's proposal seems a non-starter. No "great power" wants to a bunch of smaller states into the world-shaping club. And even if that were to happen, it's not clear the situation wouldn't be similar to the existing (and totally ineffectual) UN General Assembly, where smaller states' votes are routinely bought by great powers if necessary...

Georgia update

2004-08-16T22:16:00.000-07:00

As regular readers know, the tension in the former Soviet republic Georgia has been a regular topic for discussion on Tacitus Project. So I was interested to read the NY Times take on the situation tonight. My gut reaction: C.J. Chivers has missed the stor here.

The problem starts at the headline: "Georgia's New Leader Baffles U.S. and Russia Alike". The headline is totally incongruous with the story that follows, which focuses on the internal Georgian dynamics between the separatist regions and President Mikhail Saakashvili.

Chivers opens by lauding Saakashvili for his aggressive efforts to fight corruption, revive the moribund economy and pursue a western-oriented foreign policy. And he properly notes straight off, as an crucial caveat, that "Georgians have found his energy and momentum compelling. His popularity remains high." So whatever is baffling the US and Russia is not so baffling to Georgians, apparently.

So how exactly has Saakashvili unsettled the great powers? By pressing "forcefully for reunification [of Georgia with its breakaway regions of Abkhazia and Ossetia], increasing tensions in both regions."

The problem I have with the headline and much of the story is that it is too myopically focused on looking at the Georgia situation through the lens of an outsider. It is perfectly natural politics that Saakashvili, as a new leader riding a wave of popularity, would want to press his advantage at home. That this might ruffle feathers in Washington and Moscow is of secondary concern to Saakashvili and the Georgian people in general. Chivers must understand that Georgia probably yearns to be more than simply a client state to either Russia or the US -- and even if it will be a client state, it yearns at least to be a whole one.

But the giant, gaping hole in Chivers analysis is the failure to meaningfully describe at all how the US has been "baffled" by Saakashvili, and it fails to talk at all about Russia's strategic interests in Georgia.

The main American expert cited, the ubiquitous Martha Brill Olcott:

"Dr. Martha Brill Olcott, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, said the push against the separatists was necessary to lend him authority to tackle other problems, including reviving the economy."As he goes from sort of the nine-day wonder to a president, he has to make himself a credible figure," Dr. Olcott said. "That leaves aside the issue of whether he could have handled it better. I think he could have."

Finally, at the end of the article, we get to Washington's "official" stance: "Richard M. Miles, the American ambassador to Georgia, said in an interview last week that the United States had urged the potential combatants to disengage militarily and work toward negotiations. Washington has been Georgia's patron, funneling it $1.2 billion in aid in the past decade. With the possibility of conflict, the players here have been trying to judge Washington's stance."

The central question, the real story in Georgia right now, which was left totally unanswered, even unconsidered in Chivers' piece, is found in that last line: "the players here have been trying to judge Washington's stance." That's what Chivers and the Times should be investigating. Saakashvili's actions aren't baffling (though they may not be optimal, as Olcott notes).

Oddly (especially considering the headline), Russia's role in the intra-Georgian tension is totally ignored by Chivers, other than a note that "Russia has openly supported the separatists." Chivers might consider telling readers why this is the case. Because I am pretty sure that is an another important facet in order to understand the conflict as a whole.

All in all, a pretty shoddy piece of work, illuminating little on the interests or strategies of Russia and the US in Georgia, while failing to adequately appreciate Saakashvili's own political interest in aggressively pursuing reunification.

Personal Update

2004-08-16T22:12:00.000-07:00

I took a long-weekend hiatus from blogging, as I was attending a friend's wedding and then finally effecting the long-awaited move from East Coast to West. Today was spent settling in at the new home -- thankfully finding my roommates' Wi-Fi was already up and running!

Latest News,

2004-08-12T22:58:00.000-07:00

As Iraq explodes, Georgia smolders.

Unlike Darfur, which at least has attracted some interest in the US press, the instability in Georgia -- much of it related to Georgia's complicated relationship with Russia -- has gotten virtually no press coverage. As such, Georgia risks becoming something of a "second Chechnya" -- another armed conflict in the former USSR that Washington doesn't talk about (for fear of souring relations with Russia) and hence the American press doesn't report on (since, as the Iraq war build-up confirmed, the press draws most of its storylines from Washington). Hopefully I'll be proven wrong in two ways: 1) Georgia and Russia and Georgia's breakaway republics figure out a way to resolve their differences without bloodshed; 2) the western press and Washington are spurred to at least take a vocal position on the conflict.

Brad DeLong

2004-08-12T22:32:00.000-07:00

has an excellent idea.

I don't know when the Kerry oppo research team is going to kick into high gear, but there is plenty of material out there like this from the past few years. Or even the past few weeks (let's contrast the recent economic news with every Bush stump speech where he talks of the economy being "strong and getting strong" or having "turned the corner".

George Herbert Walker Bush was portrayed (fairly or unfairly) in 1992 as being out of touch because he didn't know the cost of a gallon of milk. You'd think someone in the Kerry camp would think to try out that strategy this time round.