Monday, March 28, 2005
Kyrgyzstan, Finally
Not as in "they finally ousted Akaev", but as in "Tacitus finally opines on the Kyrgyzstan situation". If you haven't heard about the "Tulip Revolution" by now, well, frankly I am confused how you might have stumbled across my little, tiny, wee corner of cyberspace.
A few off-the-cuff observations about the Kyrgyz "coup".
1) "Tulip Revolution" is a really stupid name. Why do we feel the need to name each and every transition in the former Eastern bloc? I mean, the "Rose Revolution" and "Orange Revolution" in Georgia and Ukraine, respectively, were extremely different in the sense that they involved incumbents losing in actual, scheduled elections (not like the American Revolution, or the French Revolution), while in Kyrgyzstan what occurred was more like an abdication (again, not like a full on revolution in the traditionally understood sense). But I object less to the use of the the word revolution than the naming policy in general. It's silly, making my fervent objections to it silly as well. I'll stop.
2) This won't happen anywhere else in Central Asia, at least not in the same manner and not anytime soon. In Turkmenistan, I think there is a real risk of an actual violent coup to take out Niyazov. A popular uprising of the sort in Kyrgyzstan is unlikely. Uzbekistan is more cohesive geographically and ethnically than Kyrgyzstan (no yawning North-South divide) and Karimov is a much more savvy dictator than Akaev could ever hope to be. In Kazakhstan, Nazarbaev is both savvy, like Karimov, and genuinely fairly popular, unlike other Central Asian leaders. In Tajikistan, well, people seem fairly content with Rakhmonov and who the heck cares about Tajikistan anyways? In Afghanistan, Karzai is more likely to be offed or forced out by force than by a demonstration (not that I'm saying either are truly likely).
3) The Kyrgyz "opposition" (scare quotes employed because to speak of an single, unitary opposition in Kyrgyzstan simply impossible) is NOT READY to lead the country. They don't have the organizational capacities, they don't have the cooperation and most importantly, in contrast to Georgia or Ukraine (or, going back further, Poland or the Czech republic), they don't have a recognizable and charismatic leader. Perhaps Bakiev will emerge as such, though I have little hope for a person whose chief accomplishment as prime minister (under Akaev, incidentally) was being fired after police killed several demonstrators at an opposition rally AGAINST his government (which was a major turning point against Akaev himself). Another likely candidate, former Bishkek mayor and Interior Minister Felix Kulov, who until last week was imprisoned on probably trumped up charges, looks much stronger. But Kulov has been in prison, and hence cut off from the bulk of the opposition, so he would need somebody closer to the fray to step up for him to consolidate backing. And Kulov is widely believed to have ties to either Russia's FSB or the CIA, Either rumor definitely works against him.
4) The BIG, HUGE elephant in the room that no one in the Western press seems to want to talk about: Akaev fled when it became clear that his police and military would no longer defend him against the demostrators. Someone made that decision -- I've heard reports that the guards around the presidential palace left the area in an orderly fashion, and police were abruptly called off after several fairly violent melees with the crowd. Who was that person/group? Whoever controls the security forces has substantial leverage over the survival of the interim as well as an permanent governments, should he/she/they choose to exert that leverage. That's a major potential power broker unaccounted for.
5) There is still many dicey days ahead for Kyrgyzstan. There exists the North-South conflict, which looms ominously and is largely unaddressed. The strongest opposition to Akaev was always concentrated in the South, but the seat of political power is in Bishkek and the North. The Southern opposition feel that they were responsible for Akaev's ouster, while it was the folks in Bishkek who were the one's sitting at Akaev's desk last week. These two groups need to find a way to peacefully divide up the political spoils of their work, or it could get ugly fast. Also in this cocktail we need to throw in the fact that the South is much more traditional and Muslim, and there is therefore an opening for radical Islamist activity, particularly in the always unstable Ferghana Valley.
So while we in the US of A are all "rah rah democracy sweeps the CIS", let's not forget the real risks that still exist, and unfortunately these risks are largely outside of our control. We simply need to take whatever steps we can, both diplomatically and covertly, to ensure that Kyrgyzstan stays as stable as possible in the coming months.
Update: I thought I was adding some realism to the public discourse. Elinor Burkett has an even more dire take on the recent events and hope for the future in the NY Times.
A few off-the-cuff observations about the Kyrgyz "coup".
1) "Tulip Revolution" is a really stupid name. Why do we feel the need to name each and every transition in the former Eastern bloc? I mean, the "Rose Revolution" and "Orange Revolution" in Georgia and Ukraine, respectively, were extremely different in the sense that they involved incumbents losing in actual, scheduled elections (not like the American Revolution, or the French Revolution), while in Kyrgyzstan what occurred was more like an abdication (again, not like a full on revolution in the traditionally understood sense). But I object less to the use of the the word revolution than the naming policy in general. It's silly, making my fervent objections to it silly as well. I'll stop.
2) This won't happen anywhere else in Central Asia, at least not in the same manner and not anytime soon. In Turkmenistan, I think there is a real risk of an actual violent coup to take out Niyazov. A popular uprising of the sort in Kyrgyzstan is unlikely. Uzbekistan is more cohesive geographically and ethnically than Kyrgyzstan (no yawning North-South divide) and Karimov is a much more savvy dictator than Akaev could ever hope to be. In Kazakhstan, Nazarbaev is both savvy, like Karimov, and genuinely fairly popular, unlike other Central Asian leaders. In Tajikistan, well, people seem fairly content with Rakhmonov and who the heck cares about Tajikistan anyways? In Afghanistan, Karzai is more likely to be offed or forced out by force than by a demonstration (not that I'm saying either are truly likely).
3) The Kyrgyz "opposition" (scare quotes employed because to speak of an single, unitary opposition in Kyrgyzstan simply impossible) is NOT READY to lead the country. They don't have the organizational capacities, they don't have the cooperation and most importantly, in contrast to Georgia or Ukraine (or, going back further, Poland or the Czech republic), they don't have a recognizable and charismatic leader. Perhaps Bakiev will emerge as such, though I have little hope for a person whose chief accomplishment as prime minister (under Akaev, incidentally) was being fired after police killed several demonstrators at an opposition rally AGAINST his government (which was a major turning point against Akaev himself). Another likely candidate, former Bishkek mayor and Interior Minister Felix Kulov, who until last week was imprisoned on probably trumped up charges, looks much stronger. But Kulov has been in prison, and hence cut off from the bulk of the opposition, so he would need somebody closer to the fray to step up for him to consolidate backing. And Kulov is widely believed to have ties to either Russia's FSB or the CIA, Either rumor definitely works against him.
4) The BIG, HUGE elephant in the room that no one in the Western press seems to want to talk about: Akaev fled when it became clear that his police and military would no longer defend him against the demostrators. Someone made that decision -- I've heard reports that the guards around the presidential palace left the area in an orderly fashion, and police were abruptly called off after several fairly violent melees with the crowd. Who was that person/group? Whoever controls the security forces has substantial leverage over the survival of the interim as well as an permanent governments, should he/she/they choose to exert that leverage. That's a major potential power broker unaccounted for.
5) There is still many dicey days ahead for Kyrgyzstan. There exists the North-South conflict, which looms ominously and is largely unaddressed. The strongest opposition to Akaev was always concentrated in the South, but the seat of political power is in Bishkek and the North. The Southern opposition feel that they were responsible for Akaev's ouster, while it was the folks in Bishkek who were the one's sitting at Akaev's desk last week. These two groups need to find a way to peacefully divide up the political spoils of their work, or it could get ugly fast. Also in this cocktail we need to throw in the fact that the South is much more traditional and Muslim, and there is therefore an opening for radical Islamist activity, particularly in the always unstable Ferghana Valley.
So while we in the US of A are all "rah rah democracy sweeps the CIS", let's not forget the real risks that still exist, and unfortunately these risks are largely outside of our control. We simply need to take whatever steps we can, both diplomatically and covertly, to ensure that Kyrgyzstan stays as stable as possible in the coming months.
Update: I thought I was adding some realism to the public discourse. Elinor Burkett has an even more dire take on the recent events and hope for the future in the NY Times.
# posted by Tacitus @ 8:47 PM 
